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INTRODUCTION

Public international law, through its rules regulating the dealings
between independent nations, purports to impose limits on the actions
of all governments, including those of the United States. In this context
American lawyers interested in foreign relations may reasonably wonder
whether American courts would enforce rules of public international
law purporting to bind the United States against the United States government, particularly the executive branch. A fair number of Supreme
Court cases have dealt with the enforceability of treaties in American
courts.' Treaties, however, are only one source of international law. The
other important source, customary international law,2 is neither expressly mentioned in the Constitution nor much discussed in Supreme
Court cases. Customary international law also differs in important respects from treaties. Treaties are by necessity purely consensual arrangements between the parties. Rules of customary law, as the
definition implies, are matters of general practice that can come into
existence if a practice can fairly be labelled "general." Thus, a state
that did not actively participate in the practice that culminated in the
creation of a rule could find itself bound by the rule anyway, at least if
that state did not actively dissent during the period of the rule's
gestation.
Recently, the question whether the federal courts have the authority to compel the President to adhere to rules of customary interna4
tional law has drawn comment from writers interested in the subject.
Some have taken the position that the courts in fact possess such authority, at least when Congress has not by statute established for the
United States a rule different from that which international law would
apply to the issue in question.' According to these writers, one with
standing to complain of a contemplated presidential action that would
violate customary international law should be able to obtain from a federal court an injunction forbidding the action. For example, some have
suggested that the federal courts could, on the basis of customary inter1. See, e.g., Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
2. Customary international law is defined as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law
." I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (3d ed. 1979).
3. Waldock, General Course on Public InternationalLaw, 106 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 49-50
(1962).
4. See, e.g., Note, Agora: May the President Violate Customary InternationalLaw (pts 1 &
2), 80 AM. J. INT'L LAW 913 (1986), 81 Am. J. INT'L LAW 371 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrong?, 80 Am. J. INT'L LAW 923 (1986)
[hereinafter Glennon, Can the President];Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of
Customary InternationalLaw by the Executive Unconstitutional?,80 Nw. U.L. REv. 321 (1985)
[hereinafter Glennon, PaqueteHabana];Paust, The PresidentIs Bound by InternationalLaw, 81
AM. J. INT'L LAW 377 (1987).
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national law, forbid the Executive to mine Nicaragua's harbors6 or control the Executive's treatment of undocumented aliens.7
The implications of this view are unsettling. Respectable authorities contend that customary international law speaks to a number of
fundamental questions of international relations, forbidding, for example, the use of force by one government against another except in selfdefense, or the intervention by one state in another's internal civil
strife.8 Thus, if the courts can compel presidential obedience to customary international law, the courts become the ultimate authority for determining the foreign policy of the United States in a wide variety of
circumstances.
Judicial control of foreign policy is an obviously startling aspect of
applying customary international law to the Presidency, but the idea
raises other questions as well. Neither the Constitution nor any statute
explicitly establishes any presidential duty to adhere to customary international law. If customary international law, nonetheless, is seen as
binding on the President as a matter of American law, it is necessary to
determine precisely how customary international law fits into the body
of American law-a determination not easy to make. Moreover, to argue that the judiciary may control the President's actions on the basis
of a body of nonconstitutional, nonstatutory law assumes the existence
of a very broad reach for the lawmaking power of federal courts that
would not likely be limited to the field of international law.
This Article argues that the President is not bound by international law. Of course, when statutes or constitutional provisions duplicate rules of international law, the President would act unlawfully if he
violated these statutes or constitutional provisions. Whether the act was
also a violation of international law would be irrelevant.
At the outset, one crucial assumption upon which this Article rests
must be made explicit: The Constitution does not require obedience to
international law by the United States as an entity. In other words, the
President is not precluded from violating international law if that violation is authorized by statute. Some authors have disagreed with this
assumption, 9 but others who argue that the President acting alone is
bound by international law agree that Congress is not so bound.10 In
6. Glennon, Paquete Habana, supra note 5, at 355.
7. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. FerrerMazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
8. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 98-102.
9. See Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. Rav. 1071, 1130-34 (1985); Paust, supra note 5, at 389-90.
10. See Glennon, Paquete Habana, supra note 5, at 328-30; Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV.
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any case the assumption seems justified because the Supreme Court not
only has refused to read such a limitation into the Constitution, but
also has upheld the power of Congress to breach one of the most basic
rules of international law-the rule requiring that treaties be
observed.11
If the foregoing assumption is accepted, then the viewpoint this Article opposes-the view that the President cannot violate customary international law-must treat customary international law as a species of
federal common law, binding on the President through his obligation to
"take [c]are that the [flaws be faithfully executed. ' 12 This Article seeks
to demonstrate that customary international law enjoys no such status.
Part II demonstrates that customary international law was almost
surely not intended to be among the "laws" that the President is
obliged to take care are faithfully executed. Part III examines the development of the federal common law and establishes that the courts
have never perceived their authority to establish rules of decision in
certain matters as applying to subjects like customary international law.
Finally, Part IV demonstrates that, apart from the general limitations
applicable to courts applying the federal common law, judicial control
of presidential discretion on questions of foreign affairs unencumbered
by statutory or constitutional prohibitions would violate basic principles of separation of powers.
II. FAITHFUL ExECUTION AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A.

The Question to Be Answered

The President's duty to adhere to customary international law has
been asserted to follow from a simple syllogism. According to The Pa1 3 customary international law is "part of our law." 4 The
quete Habana,
Constitution imposes on the President the duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. Therefore, the President has the duty to see
that the part of our law which is customary international law is faithfully executed.' 5
853, 877-78 (1987); Kirgis, Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and "Self-Executing Custom," 81
AM. J. INT'L LAW 371, 373 (1987).

11. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
13. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In The Paquete Habana the Supreme Court held that, under customary international law, coastal fishing vessels not involved in hostilities could not be captured in
war, and therefore that certain vessels captured by the American fleet blockading Cuba during the
Spanish-American War could not be condemned as prizes of war.
14. Id. at 700. This Article will later examine in more detail what can be meant by the assertion that customary international law is part of United States law. See infra notes 138-53 and
accompanying text.
15. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government to Vio-
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Was customary international law among the laws that the Constitution expected the President to see faithfully executed? The issue is
phrased in this way because some laws, applicable within the United
States, obviously fall outside the President's responsibilities. This conclusion follows from the nature of the Constitution, which delegates
only certain powers to the federal government. Those powers do not
include powers necessary to deal with a number of subjects on which
law can be expected to exist. The general criminal law is but one example. To give the President unlimited law enforcement responsibility
would oblige the President to enforce laws clearly falling outside the
federal government's area of authority; it would require, for example,
the President to be responsible for enforcing the criminal law of the
states. Clearly, the President's responsibilities do not extend so far; the
President is not expected to take care that state criminal law is faithfully executed. If it is possible to identify one body of law to which the
"take care" clause has no application, the clause likewise may not apply
to other bodies of law. The immediate problem, then, is whether the
"take care" clause was meant to apply to customary international law.
Unfortunately, few judicial constructions of this clause exist, and
none has addressed the issue of whether the clause applies to customary
international law. Similar constitutional provisions, however, have been
construed many times. In particular, the courts have frequently considered section 2 of article III, extending the judicial power of the United
States to "all cases. . . arising under. . . the laws of the United States
.. .. " If one may legitimately assume that the Framers meant to limit
the President's enforcement obligations to the "laws of the United
States" referred to in article III, then the extent of the President's duty
may be determined by examining judicial readings of article III. Nothing in the language of the Constitution seems to cast doubt on this approach, and the assumption that the term "laws" was intended to have
the same meaning in both articles hardly seems unreasonable. Further,
as shown above, because the Framers could not have intended the President's obligation to extend to all conceivable laws, logic suggests reading into article II's use of the term "law" the qualifier "of the United
States."
Following this approach, however, presents a problem. As is shown
by any comparison of the thinking in Swift v. Tyson1 6 to that in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 1 judicial understanding of the term "laws" has
evolved greatly since the drafting of the Constitution. If the term
late Customary InternationalLaw, 80 AM. J. INT'L LAW 913, 914 (1986).
16. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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"laws" was intended to mean in article II what it was intended to mean
in article III, must the reading of the term in article II change when the
reading of the term in article III changes?
The answer to that question would appear to be a clear "no."
Changes in judicial understanding of the term "law" as it affects judicial power do not necessarily reflect changes in the understanding of
presidential responsibility. On the contrary, nothing in the cases suggests any change in the courts' understanding of what laws the Framers
intended the President to see faithfully executed. On this issue, then,
there is no reason to doubt that the Framers' intent should govern
modern readings of the Constitution. Moreover, readings of the term
"laws of the United States" closest in time to the drafting of the Constitution would seem most likely to reflect the obligation the Framers
intended to impose on the President. Therefore, this discussion will focus on pre-Eriejudicial interpretations of the article III phrase "laws of
the United States" as the most likely indicators of the laws that the
President was to see faithfully executed.
B. General Law and the Law of Nations
A late twentieth century lawyer, seeking to determine the extent to
which the Constitution intended to compel the President to adhere to
customary international law, faces the problem of avoiding anachronism. As noted above, ways of thinking about law have changed over
the past two centuries. Accordingly, determining the obligations that
the Framers sought to impose on the President requires figuring out
how the Framers thought about the areas of law in question.
An essential prerequisite to deciding what lawmakers of the period
thought about this subject is recognizing those discussions of law surrounding the subject. This task is not easy because of changes in terminology since the 1780s. The term "customary international law" was not
employed during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As
Professor Dickinson has explained, the subjects now treated as falling
within customary international law-subjects principally involving state
versus state questions-were seen as elements of the "law of nations." 18
The law of nations included not only these subjects, but also the law
merchant, maritime law, and the subject presently known as conflicts of
law rules.1" To confuse further the terminological problem, the term
"general law," for which the term "common law" was sometimes em18. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Partof the National Law of the United States, 101 U.
PA. L. REV. 26, 26-29 (1952).

19. Id.; Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1231, 1263-64
(1985) [hereinafter Jay, Part Two].
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ployed, was occasionally treated during this period as a synonym for the
term "law of nations," and was sometimes seen as embracing the "law
of nations" along with other subjects.2" Thus, when encountering references from this period to the "law of nations," one must not assume
that the writer was discussing only, or even primarily, what is known as
customary international law. Likewise, one must realize that references
during this period to "general law" are references to an umbrella term
that included what now would be called customary international law.
Finally, it is important to note that late eighteenth and early nineteenth century descriptions and analyses of subjects such as the law
merchant and maritime law addressed topics seen at the time as part of
the law of nations. Thus, such descriptions and analyses are relevant to
an understanding of the early thinking about other elements of the law
of nations, such as the area now labelled customary international law.
Aside from the terminological changes of the past two hundred
years, the alteration in jurisprudential thinking evidenced by the overruling of Swift v. Tyson2 1 in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins22 also makes
difficult the investigation of this subject. Erie acknowledged the existence of and rejected the jurisprudential theory that "there is 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute.' ",23 The Erie court took
the position that no rule can be law without some definite authority
behind it, and that, if the authority for the particular rule is a judicial
decision rather than a statute, the court handing down the decision is
making law to the same extent that a legislature does when it enacts a
statute.4
During the period in question, however, courts analyzing "general
law" accepted this theory of a "transcendental body of law outside of
any particular state but binding within it." Under this view, general
law, which governed subjects not strictly local in character, simply represented the concrete application of natural reason to a particular set of
facts. The authority of general law did not derive from any particular
government, although all governments were assumed to adhere to it;
rather, general law was seen as an aspect of natural law, and binding for
20. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) (referring to "Universal Law");
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161
(1795) (Iredell, J.); Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance,97 HARv.L. REv. 1513, 1524 (1984); Jay, Part Two, supra
note 19, at 1263-64.

21. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
22. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
24. Id. at 78-80.
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that reason. Courts asserted, correctly or not, that law on those subjects
falling within the realm of general law was uniform all over the world,
and that all courts in all states attempted to determine what result reason would dictate in a particular set of circumstances. Judges who decided cases were not making law; they were discovering law by
deduction. Judicial decisions were evidence of the content of general
law, but were not the law itself; general law, rather, was whatever reason would dictate on the facts.25
Distinct from general law was local law, including both judicial decisions on matters distinctly local and the statutes of particular localities. Just as all courts were expected to apply general law to those
subjects it governed, so courts were expected to apply local law to matters properly determined by local rules.26
Thus, the relevant jurisprudential context in the period under consideration was as follows: The law of nations embraced a greater variety
of subjects than is now true of customary international law, and was
perceived as a manifestation of natural law, rather than a law that pro2' 7
ceeded from, in the language of Erie, "some definite authority.
Against this background, the question now becomes: Did the "laws of
the United States" include this "law of nations"?
C. The Law of Nations and the Laws of the United States
1. Beginnings of the Controversy
Whether the law of nations formed part of the laws of the United
States was an issue of debate during the early years of the Republic. In
essence, the Federalists, in office during this period, contended that the
federal courts established in 1789 had jurisdiction irrespective of the
parties' citizenship to hear both common-law civil and criminal actions,
which would have included actions grounded on the law of nations. The
Republicans, on the other hand, insisted both that Congress had not
conferred such jurisdiction on the courts, and that any attempt to have
done so would have been unconstitutional.2 8 The disagreement did not
flow from concerns about abstractions, but was an aspect of the larger
disagreement between the two parties concerning the powers of the federal government. The Federalists argued that the power of applying the
common law necessarily inhered in all courts through their character as
25. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1517-21; Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1053-61 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Part One]; Jay, Part Two, supra note 19, at
1263-64.
26. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1527-38.
27. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
28. The following discussion depends heavily on Jay, Part One, supra note 25.
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courts. The Republicans countered that the common law was a complete system, regulating all subjects on which law might be made; if
federal courts could apply that system, purely as a function of their
being courts and without regard to diversity of citizenship, it followed
that the federal Congress could legislate on the subjects comprising the
common law, because it was taken for granted that legislative and judicial jurisdiction were coextensive. That the common law was a complete
system, however, would mean that the authority of the federal Congress
was unlimited, contrary to the clear limitations imposed on its powers
by the Constitution. 9
This debate was very active for a time and can be traced through
various authorities. In the early 1790s, Supreme Court Justices sitting
on circuit courts charged juries that acts by individual American citizens compromising American neutrality in the wars of the French
Revolution were violations of the law of nations and, therefore, violations of the law of the United States." Similarly, Attorney General
Bradford in 1795 expressed the opinion that acts by individuals within
United States territory against states in amity with the United States
violated American treaty commitments to maintain good relations, and
therefore were offenses against the United States.' Juries, however, refused to convict for nonstatutory violations of the law of nations," and
the Washington Administration, in an effort to end doubts as to its authority in the absence of statute, obtained passage of neutrality legislation." By 1802, Attorney General Lincoln of the new Republican
administration expressed the view that an altercation apparently involving an insult to the Spanish minister was "an aggravated violation
of the law of nations," which "is considered as a part of the municipal
law of each State."3 4 Attorney General Lincoln, however, "doubt[ed]
the competence of the federal courts" because there was "no statute
33
recognizing the offence."
Eventually, it became clear that the Republicans had won the debate-the "laws of the United States" did not include either all of
"general law" or its "law of nations" component. The Supreme Court's
first pronouncement on the subject, United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,36 decided in 1812, established that the circuit courts of the United
29. Jay, Part One, supra note 25, at 1078-83.
30. Id. at 1042-52.
31. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795).
32. Jay, Part One, supra note 25, at 1051.
33. Id. at 1052-53; see also The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1897).
34. 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 691, 692 (1802).
35. Id.
36. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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States had no jurisdiction over common-law crimes.37 Because section
11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in fact conferred on the circuit courts
"exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the
authority of the United States, 3 8 Hudson & Goodwin necessarily
stands for the proposition that common-law offenses were not cognizable "under the authority of the United States." This position was reaffirmed in United States v. Coolidge,"' also involving a defendant
indicted for a common-law offense. The Attorney General refused to
argue the case for the United States; the defendant did not appear in
the Supreme Court; and the Court was unwilling, without argument, to
disturb the precedent of Hudson & Goodwin. The Court held that the
case was controlled by Hudson & Goodwin and that the circuit court,
therefore, had no jurisdiction on the facts presented.4 0 Thus, the Supreme Court, by 1816, had signaled that the general law was not law of
the United States.
2. Subsequent Developments
After Coolidge and throughout the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court consistently held that neither general law as a whole nor
the law of nations, to the extent the two terms were not seen as coextensive, were "laws of the United States." The Court maintained this
position in at least two contexts: Its dealings with admiralty and its
construction of its authority to review decisions from state courts.
a. Admiralty
The Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States
to admiralty and maritime cases. 41 The First Congress not only granted
that jurisdiction to the district courts, but also made that grant exclusive.42 As noted above, admiralty was seen during this period as an element of the law of nations. Not surprisingly, therefore, the courts
invested with admiralty jurisdiction took for granted that the only rules
to apply when dealing with matters in admiralty jurisdiction were those
37. Id. at 33-34.
38. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (approved Sept. 24, 1789) [hereinafter Judiciary Act of 1789].
39. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
40. Id. at 415-17. This result is mildly surprising, given that the offense charged, forcibly
rescuing a ship from an American privateer, fell within the admiralty jurisdiction and that the
Constitution, article III, clause 2, expressly provides that admiralty is within the judicial power of
the United States. Indeed, Justice Story, sitting as a circuit justice at the trial, had relied in part
on the admiralty character of the proceedings in upholding the circuit court's jurisdiction. United
States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857).
41. U.S. CONsT. art. M, cl. 2.
42. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 38, § 9, at 76-77.
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suggested by the law of nations, deduced from scholars' writings and
judicial decisions from various countries. 3 In applying these rules, the
Supreme Court made clear that it did not see itself as applying the
"laws of the United States," but rather a distinct body of law-the law
of nations.
Although earlier decisions contained language demonstrating that
the Court saw admiralty law as standing apart from the law of the
United States, 4 - American Insurance Co. v. Canter" most clearly states
the Court's position. The Court in that case had to decide whether a
court of the Territory of Florida could properly exercise admiralty jurisdiction. The Court considered the seventh and eighth sections of the
statute establishing Florida's courts as the only possible bases for such
jurisdiction. 4" The eighth section conferred on the territorial courts jurisdiction to hear cases "arising under the laws . . . of the United

States. ' 47 Although the Court ultimately upheld the territorial court's
admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of the seventh section of the statute,
it expressly held that the eighth section did not confer such jurisdiction
because admiralty cases do not arise under the laws of the United
States.
The Court based this conclusion on two grounds. It first observed
that article III of the Constitution extended the federal judicial power
to cases arising under the laws of the United States in one clause, while
extending that power to admiralty and maritime cases in a separate
clause. The Court then reasoned that the Constitution assumes that the
one grant of jurisdiction does not include the other. In other words, a
grant of jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the laws of the United
States would not amount to a grant of admiralty jurisdiction.4 8 As a
distinct ground for its conclusion, the Court stated that "[a] case in
admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the constitution or laws of the
United States. These cases are as old as navigation itself; and the law
admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our
43. For example, see the authorities relied on by Justice Story dissenting in The Nereide, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 449-54 (1815). For the proposition that the admiralty jurisdiction grant directed the courts to the general law, see Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1924).
44. Thus, in The Schooner Adeline & Cargo, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244 (1815), the Court rejected an attack on a prize court judgment grounded on the departure of the prize court from
common-law pleading rules, by holding that as a court of the law of nations, a prize court did not
take its rules from the "mere municipal regulations" of any country. Id. at 284. Again, in The Brig
Alerts & Cargo, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 359 (1815), the Court supported its result by reference to both
"the general law of nations" and the "laws of the United States." Id. at 365. In making this reference, the Court distinguished the two bodies of law.
45. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
46. Id. at 544.
47. Id. at 543.
48. Id. at 545.
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courts to the cases as they arise."4 9 As has been noted repeatedly in this
Article, admiralty was seen as one aspect of the law of nations during
the period under consideration. Canter's holding that admiralty cases
do not arise under the laws of the United States necessarily means,
therefore, that the "laws of the United States" do not include the law of
nations.
The Supreme Court reiterated its dichotomous approach to admiralty and municipal law in a procedural context in 1866,50 but the last
cases illustrating the Supreme Court's distinction between admiralty
and the "laws of the United States" do so from a different perspective
than preceding cases. In The Lottawanna5' libellants attacked an admiralty rule of decision announced in an 1819 case on the grounds that the
Supreme Court had misunderstood the rule actually applied in admiralty courts throughout the world.52 In refusing to overrule the earlier
case, the Court held:
The proposition assumes that the general maritime law governs this case, and is
binding on the courts of the United States.
But it is hardly necessary to argue that the maritime law is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country.
In this respect it is like international law or the laws of war, which have the effect
of law in no country any further than they are accepted and received as such
53

Holding that the rule declared in the earlier case remained the maritime law of the United States, the Court held itself powerless to alter
5 4
the rule.
The Court reaffirmed the reasoning of The Lottawanna through
dictum in The Scotland5 and, speaking through Justice Holmes, relied
on that reasoning in In re Western Maid.5 6 Libellants in Western Maid
had libelled certain merchant vessels that had been chartered to the
United States during World War I and, while under government control, had collided with vessels owned by libellants. The libels had been
filed after the vessels had reverted to their owners' control. The govern49. Id. at 545-46.
50. In United States v. Weed, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 62 (1866), the Court had to address the
question whether the government, which incorrectly had libelled certain property as prize of war,
could proceed against the property as subject to forfeiture under certain statutes simply by
amending the libel. Id. at 66-71. The Court characterized the problem as one in which all proceedings had been in prize, though the suit was "not a case of prize, but of forfeiture under municipal
law." Id. at 71.
51. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
52. Id. at 571.
53. Id. at 571-72.
54. Id. at 576-78.
55. 105 U.S. 24, 31 (1881).
56. 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
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ment, authorized by statute to defend the suits, sought writs of prohibition against the proceedings. 57 In granting the writs, the Court
addressed the idea that general maritime law necessarily created liability on these facts:
In deciding this question we must realize that however ancient may be the traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from which it has been drawn, it
derives its whole and only power in this country from its having been accepted and
adopted by the United States. There is no mystic over-law to which even the
United States must bow. When a case is said to be governed by foreign law or by
general maritime law that is only a short way of saying that for this purpose the
sovereign power takes up a rule suggested from without and makes it part of its
own rules.58

The Court then went on to hold that, because the United States had
not consented to waive its sovereign immunity as to suits of this sort,
no tort had been committed for which libellants could recover. 9
While the jurisprudential approaches taken by the cases from The
Schooner Adeline through Weed, on the one hand, and the approach
taken by The Lottawanna and the Western Maid on the other, could
not differ more, neither approach is compatible with the argument that
the law of nations is an element of the law of the United States. Both
groups of cases see the law of nations and municipal law as distinct.
The older group asserts the distinction and further asserts that admiralty courts apply the law of nations instead of municipal law. The latter group asserts the distinction, denies that an American court ever
applies the law of nations itself, and insists instead that an American
court only applies rules that the United States has elected freely to
bring into municipal law. While there is absolute disagreement between
them as to the binding character of the law of nations, the cases absolutely agree that rules of the law of nations are not binding because of
the law of nations' alleged status as a part of the law of the United
States. The older group maintains the separation of the two bodies of
law and treats both as controlling in proper circumstances. The younger
group also treats the two bodies of law as distinct, but in effect denies
that general law necessarily must have any effect whatever within the
United States. Taken together, the admiralty cases clearly reject the
equation that "law of nations" equals "laws of the United States."
57. Id. at 429-32.
58. Id. at 432.
59. Id. at 432-34.
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Supreme Court Review of State Cases

Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 178960 permitted the Supreme
Court to review decisions from the highest state courts in which the
validity of a state statute or an exercise of state authority was being
attacked on the grounds of its "being repugnant to the constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States. '61 This language was retained
throughout the nineteenth century,6 2 and therefore governed the Supreme Court's jurisdiction of appeals from the state courts during the
period in question. The Supreme Court's consideration of its own appellate jurisdiction, therefore, obliged it to consider whether particular
state actions involved the "laws of the United States." The Court consistently held that questions exclusively involving general law, including
questions involving the law of nations, did not involve the "laws of the
United States" and, therefore, were not reviewable under Section 25
and its successors.
In a number of cases in the early 1870s, the Court refused to review
state decisions that addressed the effect of Confederate Government's
existence on private transactions, holding that such cases involved matters of "public policy" or "general law" and, therefore, were not reviewable under Section 25.6 In turn, all of these decisions were cited in New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren,6 4 a case that is particularly relevant to this discussion. In that case, an insurance company sought review of a Virginia state court judgment holding it liable under an
insurance policy on the life of a Virginia resident who died in Virginia
in 1862. The company urged as a basis of Supreme Court review errors
in the jury instructions concerning the effect of civil war on contracts.
The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the case presented
questions of general law alone. 5 The result was supported by the observation that "[i]t was not contended, so far as we can discover, that the
general laws of war, as recognized by the law of nations applicable to
this case, were in any respect modified or suspended by the constitution, laws, treaties, or executive proclamations, of the United States." 6
In other words, the court held that the "general laws of war" were not
60. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 38, § 25, at 85-87.
61. Id. at 85.
62. Section 25 was amended twice during this period, by the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14
Stat. 385, 386, and by the Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 316, 318, but neither amendment
substantially altered the language in question.
63. See Rockhold v. Rockhold, 92 U.S. 129 (1875); Tarver v. Keach, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 67
(1872); Delmas v. Insurance Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661 (1871); Bethell v. Demaret, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 537 (1870).
64. 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
65. Id. at 286-87.

66. Id.
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part of the law of the United States. It should be noted that the Court
took this position notwithstanding the vigorous dissent of Justice Brad"unwritten interley, who insisted that section 25 was satisfied because
67
national law" was the law of the United States.
For the rest of the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century,
the Supreme Court adhered to the view that general law, including the
law of nations, did not fall within the category "laws of the United
States."68 Three of the post-Hendren cases are particularly relevant to
this discussion. The plaintiffs in City and County of San Francisco v.
Scott6 9 challenged as unauthorized a grant of land made by an official

of the pueblo of San Francisco after California had been conquered by
the United States but before San Francisco had been incorporated as a
city. The Court observed that the case did
not depend on any legislation of Congress, or on the terms of the treaty, but on the
effect of the conquest upon the powers of local government in the pueblo under the
Mexican laws. That is a question of general public law, as to which the decisions of
the State Court are not reviewable here."°

This result is particularly significant because the Court in earlier cases
apparently had seen this type of question as raising issues under the
law of nations. 71
Huntington v. Attril 72 also contains language bearing upon the
subject under consideration. That case concerned a challenge to the refusal of the Maryland courts to enforce a New York judgment rendered
on a claim based on a New York statute. The Maryland court had held
that the statute was penal and that, under conflicts principles, the court
was not obliged to enforce either a foreign penal statute or a judgment
based on such a statute. The Supreme Court characterized the issue as
one of "international law," and as such a matter of "general jurisprudence.

'7 3

The Court observed that it would have no jurisdiction to re-

view a state court's application of this "international rule" in dealing
67. Id. at 287-88 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
68. See United States v. Thompson, 93 U.S. 586, 588-89 (1876); Dugger v. Bocock, 104 U.S.
596, 601-04 (1881); Chicago & A.R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 623-24 (1887); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1903).
69. 111 U.S. 768 (1884).
70. Id. at 769.
71. This result follows from the Court's treatment of More v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70 (1888), a
diversity case also involving the effect of the American conquest on the authority of California
officials. The More opinion addressed the appellants' argument that the laws of a conquered country, except those involving political institutions, remain in force. Id. at 81. The reporter's account
of appellants' argument, id. at 75, shows that they relied on Mitehel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 711, 749 (1835), for this argument. Mitchel, in turn, described the rule in question as established by the law of nations. Id.
72. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
73. Id. at 683.

1220

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1205

with a suit based on another state's statute.74 When, however, the issue
was a state court's refusal to enforce a judgment based on such a suit,
the federal full faith and credit statute was implicated; the statutory
question, the Court held, gave it jurisdiction to review the state's application of "international law. '7 5 Huntington did not involve what in
1987 would be labelled in the United States an "international law"
question. Its use of that term teaches caution in assuming that the
courts in this period mean by the term "international law" the same
thing modern writers mean. Moreover, the Huntington Court's treatment of what it saw as an international law issue reinforces the thrust
of Hendren: international law was a matter of "general jurisprudence"
and matters of "general jurisprudence" did not involve the laws of the
United States.
As late as 1924 the Court adhered to this view. In that year the
Court held in Transportes Maritimos do Estado v. Almeida 6 that no
question under federal law was presented by a case that turned on
whether a defendant could rely on immunity as a foreign sovereign. For
most of the history of the United States, then, the Supreme Court has
held that general law, seen as including customary international law, is
not part of the laws of the United States for purposes of appellate
review.
3. Apparent Counterarguments
The foregoing discussion would appear to establish that the body
of law now called customary international law was not seen, in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as being among the "laws of the
United States" as that term was used in article III. Various authorities,
however, have disagreed with this view. Some rely on the views articulated by certain of the Framers. Others place much weight on the implications of the Alien Tort Claim Act.7 Still others rely on language from
particular cases or from certain opinions by attorneys general of the
United States. This section examines these counterarguments and seeks
to refute them.
a. Views of the Framers
Some have argued that statements by various Framers of the Constitution demonstrate that these individuals believed it important that
74. Id.
75. Id. at 683-84.
76. 265 U.S. 104 (1924).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (originally enacted as Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat.
73, 76-77).
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the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear cases involving the law of
nations, and that those courts in fact had such jurisdiction. Such assertions support the argument that international
law was intended to be
78
among the "laws of the United States.

Some of the modern writers who make such arguments have misunderstood the sources upon which they rely.7 9 Moreover, the Framers
were hardly of one voice on this subject.80 Furthermore, this argument
does not appear to give adequate consideration to the breadth and
78. See, e.g., Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1090-95 (1985); Note, Federal Common Law and
Article III: A JurisdictionalApproach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325, 334-37 (1964).
79. For example, the writer of Federal Common Law and Article III: A JurisdictionalApproach to Erie, asserts that Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 80, apparently believed
that the law of nations was federal law. Note, supra note 78, at 335. He observed that Hamilton, in
a portion of his argument, distinguished between "'cases arising upon treaties and the law of nations'" on the one hand, and those that involve foreigners but "stand merely on the footing of the
municipal law" on the other, and suggested that Hamilton appeared to place the former within
federal question jurisdiction and the latter within the diversity jurisdiction. Id. This reading of
The FederalistNo. 80 is clearly incorrect. In that document, Hamilton enumerated six categories
of cases to which federal judicial authority should extend. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 499-500 (A.
Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). He then discussed each category in turn, explaining why he
thought federal jurisdiction was important in each case. Id. at 500-03. Finally, he listed the headings of jurisdiction set out in article III, stating which of his six categories was in fact covered by
each jurisdictional grant. The discussion to which the Note writer referred is part of Hamilton's
consideration of his fourth category, "all these [cases] which involve the peace of the Confederacy,
whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that
between the States themselves." Id. at 499-500 (emphasis in original). Hamilton's discussion did
distinguish between the cases involving treaties or the law of nations, on the one hand, and municipal law cases, on the other, but not at all in the context the Note suggests. Rather, Hamilton
observed that some people might think that only the former group needed to be in federal court,
while the latter could safely be left to the states. Hamilton, however, rejected the distinction, arguing that maltreatment of aliens by state courts could lead to war. Id. at 501. That is, the distinction was one Hamilton did not accept, and was in any case not drawn in a discussion of the
different headings of federal jurisdiction, but in a consideration of the allocation of cases between
federal and state jurisdiction. Moreover, in the part of the discussion in which Hamilton linked his
six categories to the various article III grants of jurisdiction, he stated that his fourth category was
covered by the grants of jurisdiction over cases involving treaties, cases involving ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and diversity cases. Id. at 504. That is, he labelled none of the
fourth category cases as falling under the grant of jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In The FederalistNo. 80, the only categories of cases Hamilton
saw as falling under that grant were those arising "out of the laws of the United States, passed in
pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation" (implying that Hamilton thought
"laws" meant "statutes") and those "concern[ing] the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union." Id. at 499. Hamilton's prose is pellucid; the source of the Yale
Note writer's confusion is not apparent.
80. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J. Jay) (stating that federal courts will have jurisdiction
of cases arising under the law of nations) with FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton) (stating that
federal judiciary will have jurisdiction of law of nations cases because these cases are covered by
jurisdictional grants for diversity cases and those involving treaties or ambassadors, and other public ministers, and consuls).
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vagueness of the uses of the term "law of nations." As noted above, 81
that term was applied to a much greater range of subjects than is the
term "customary international law," and was sometimes even equated
with the term "general law." This application of the term has two consequences for the argument here under consideration. First, without regard to article III's grant of jurisdiction in cases arising under the laws
of the United States, the federal jurisdictional power clearly extended
to much of the law of nations by reason of the other portions of article
III. For example, treaty questions were seen as involving the law of nations;8 2 article III gives jurisdiction over cases involving treaties. Admiralty law was an element of the law of nations; s3 admiralty jurisdiction
is expressly granted in article III. The law of nations was seen as providing special protections to ambassadors;8 4 article III expressly grants
jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors. Finally, the Framers
could rely on the diversity jurisdiction to bring into the federal courts
many cases involving the law of nations in its law merchant aspect because such cases were particularly likely to involve local people litigating against people from either other states or other countries.
Hamilton apparently believed that the federal courts' authority to
hear cases involving the law of nations flowed from the grant of diversity jurisdiction and the grants of jurisdiction over treaty questions and
cases involving ambassadors, with the federal question grant simply not
relevant to this subject.8 5 Thus, persons asserting that article III
granted jurisdiction over cases involving the law of nations need not
have had the federal question jurisdiction in mind when making such
statements. They easily could have been thinking about other elements
of article III.
The broad meaning of "law of nations" raises a second problem for
those relying on quotations from the Framers. At least some of the
Framers who asserted that the laws of the United States included the
law of nations took that position as an element of their broader belief in
the unlimited common-law jurisdiction of the federal courts. As explained above, several of the early Justices of the Supreme Court, for
example, took such positions."8 As also explained above, however, the
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the view that federal courts possessed unlimited common-law jurisdiction. This rejection obviously
weakened the authority of those Framers who contended, as an element
81.
82.
83.

See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
Dickinson, supra note 18, at 32-33.
Id. at 28-29.

84. Id. at 30.
85.
86.

See supra note 79, for discussion of The FederalistNo. 80.
See Jay, Part One, supra note 25, at 1042-52.
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of their belief in unlimited common-law jurisdiction, that the laws of
the United States included the law of nations.
This conclusion is reinforced by jurisdictional statutes of the time.
Aside from a very short-lived provision enacted in 1801,87 the federal

trial courts had no "federal question" subject matter jurisdiction until
1875,88 the year that Congress implemented the article III grant. That
is, if the law of nations was part of the "law of the United States," the
courts nonetheless lacked authority to apply it as "law of the United
States" until 1875. If the courts applied the law of nations before 1875,
therefore, their authority to do so could not rest on any determination
that the law of nations was part of the law of the United States.
Finally, any canvass of the views of the Framers must include an
examination of the structure of article III. As Chief Justice Marshall
pointed out in the Canter case,89 article III separately grants jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the laws of the United States, jurisdiction to hear cases involving ambassadors, jurisdiction to hear cases
involving treaties, and jurisdiction to hear admiralty cases. The listing
of the separate categories surely suggests that the Framers thought
none was included within any of the others-that cases involving treaties, for example, did not arise under the laws of the United States. Yet
cases involving treaties, admiralty, and ambassadors were all seen in
1789 as presenting questions arising under the law of nations. If the
phrase "laws of the United States" had been thought to include the law
of nations, the Framers would not have needed to spell out the categories of jurisdiction that they did spell out. Further, their designation of
particular aspects of the law of nations as within federal jurisdiction
suggests that the Framers took pains to make explicit the parts of that
body of law that they particularly wished to come before the federal
courts. Therefore, attaching significance to the Framers' omission of
what is now called customary international law is not unreasonable.
b. The Alien Tort Claim Act
As originally enacted, the Alien Tort Claim Act provided that the
United States district courts "shall . . . have cognizance, concurrent

with the courts of the several States, or the circuits courts, as the case
may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' 0 Some argue that,
87. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2
Stat. 132.
88. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
89. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
90. Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 38, § 9, at 77.
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because this section is not expressly limited to suits by aliens against
Americans, it does not fall within the diversity jurisdiction, and that
Congress, therefore, must have assumed that some other heading of jurisdiction was available under article III. The only possible alternative,
however, is the federal question jurisdictional grant. Therefore, the argument goes, the First Congress must have assumed that "law of nations" questions involved the laws of the United States. 1
It is true that in the twentieth century lower federal courts have
read the Act in this way.92 Moreover, no apparent legislative history has
survived to throw light on the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. While one cannot unequivocally demonstrate that this view is incorrect, alternative explanations do exist. Possibly this section
originally was intended to operate as a diversity provision; or perhaps
the First Congress thought alienage of either party, without regard to
the other party's citizenship or the subject matter of the suit, was
enough to support federal jurisdiction.
Preliminarily, it bears repeating that a reading which would bring
the law of nations within the laws of the United States would have been
a very controversial usage of those terms in 1789. Furthermore, the implication of these alternative readings-that an individual could violate
the law of nations-would have made sense in 1789. As explained several times in this Article, the term "law of nations" applied to many
subjects not now considered part of customary international law. Although modern customary international law generally may be violated
only by governments, in 1789 it was clearly thought possible that an
individual could violate the law of nations. For example, in the famous
Pennsylvania case of Respublica v. De Longchamps,9 3 which involved
the criminal prosecution of an individual for an attack on an ambassador, the sole basis for the indictment was the rule of the law of nations
protecting ambassadors.
All the foregoing responses, of course, do not explain how section
9's language purporting to grant the district courts jurisdiction to hear
suits "by aliens, for torts only" can be read fairly as applying only to
suits by aliens against Americans. To understand this point, one must
compare the language of section 9 to the language of other sections of
the Judiciary Act. First, the relevant language of section 9 in fact resembles that of section 11, which creates the alienage diversity jurisdiction. Specifically, section 11 provides, "[tihat the circuit courts shall
have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
91.
92.
93.

For an example of this argument, see Note, supra note 78, at 335-36.
See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).
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States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or equity, where...
an alien is a party. 9 4 That is, even the section that clearly must rely on
article Im's diversity grant to support its constitutionality does not require expressly that, in suits involving aliens, the other party be American. Again, section 12 of the Judiciary Act, establishing the federal
court's removal jurisdiction, uses language similar to that of sections 9
and 11. Section 12 permits removal to the circuit courts in suits "commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of the state
in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state . ...
This section omits any express requirement that suits against aliens, to
be removable, be brought by American citizens. Yet such a requirement
is clearly necessary to satisfy article HI of the Constitution.
Only two apparent explanations exist for the wording of sections 11
and 12. Either the First Congress believed it was obvious that a reference to cases in which aliens were parties implied that the other party
had to be an American, or the First Congress thought that it could confer on the federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases involving aliens without regard to either the citizenship of the other party or the subject
matter of the suit. In either case, the same reasoning that must have
inspired the wording of sections 11 and 12 dictates that section 9's lack
of language expressly requiring diversity in alien tort actions does not
mean that Congress saw itself as relying on the federal question jurisdictional grant with respect to section 9. Further support for this view
flows from section 9's express provision that the alien tort jurisdiction it
granted was to be concurrent with the jurisdiction granted the circuit
courts under section 11. Section 11, however, grants the circuit courts
no jurisdiction that conceivably could overlap with the alien tort jurisdiction except the alien diversity jurisdiction.9" As noted above, the
Congress must have assumed, therefore, either that at least some of the
alien tort cases would be cases with aliens as plaintiffs and individual
American citizens as defendants, or that alienage of one party was
enough to support federal jurisdiction.
Finally, dealing in this way with this particular piece of the diversity jurisdiction may have been deemed sensible in light of the limitations imposed on the general diversity jurisdiction. As sections 11 and
12 make clear, the first of these limitations was that the vesting of diversity jurisdiction was in the circuit courts. As originally organized in
the Judiciary Act, the circuit courts for each judicial district were to
94.
95.
96.

Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 38, § 11, at 78.
Id. § 12, at 79.
Id. § 11, at 78.
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meet only twice annually." District courts, in contrast, had four sessions a year." The second disadvantage of the general diversity jurisdiction was the amount in controversy requirement, set at 500 dollars by
sections 11 and 12. 91 Section 9, in contrast, imposed no amount in controversy requirement.1 0 0 Particularly in light of the fears expressed in
some quarters that the courts' maltreatment of aliens could lead to
war, 1 1 Congress may have wished to carve out a segment of alien diversity cases that it feared could be particularly sensitive and make sure
that alien plaintiffs in such cases would not be able to complain of being denied access to courts either because of scheduling problems or
monetary limitations.
In short, the argument that the Alien Tort Claim Act was not intended as a "federal question" provision is supported by the following:
1) The law of nations in 1789 included prohibitions that individuals
could violate; 2) this reading fits the conventional usage of terms in
1789; 3) the original language of the Act resembles language in provisions of the Judiciary Act that clearly did not rely on the argument that
the law of nations was part of the law of the United States; 4) the Act
was intended to overlap with one such provision; and 5) splitting out a
piece of the diversity jurisdiction would have made sense in light of the
general organization of the federal courts and the fears of the Framers
concerning denials of justice. The argument presented is obviously not
conclusive. The argument does, however, at least counsel caution in
reading the Alien Tort Claim Act as proving that the First Congress
believed the law of nations to be federal law.
c.

Language from Cases

Five cases from the general period in question include language
that would appear to support the argument that the law of nations was
seen as falling within the "laws of the United States." Examination of
the cases in which this language appears makes clear, however, that the
language in question was not addressing the question of the place of the
law of nations in the constitutional system. Such cases, therefore, do
not undercut the argument in this section.
In the first place, three of the five cases are admiralty cases. As has
been made clear, courts of this period saw the admiralty jurisdictional
grant as itself a basis for applying the law of nations, and in fact consid97. Id. § 4, at 74-75.
98. Id. § 3, at 73-74.
99. Id. §§ 11-12, at 78-79.

100. Id. § 9, at 77.
101. See, e.g., THE

FEDERALIST

No. 80, supra note 79, at 500-01 (A. Hamilton).
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ered admiralty courts as courts of the law of nations, rather than as
municipal courts. The application by these courts of the law of nations,
therefore, did not depend on the "laws of the United States" jurisdictional grant and, thus, their language cannot be seen as addressing the
relationship between the laws of the United States and the law of
nations.
Further, examining each of the three cases individually demonstrates that these cases cannot be used to prove that the law of nations
was understood to be part of the "laws of the United States." The earliest, Talbot v. Janson,10 2 was an admiralty case that raised the issue
whether the capture of a Dutch vessel by Americans allegedly privateering for France was a violation of American neutrality requiring restitution of the vessel. Because the case was an admiralty matter, all the
Justices applied the law of nations as a matter of course. 103 The relevant language appears in Justice Iredell's opinion; after he observed
that the act alleged was the capture by Americans in American ships of
a vessel of a state friendly to the United States, he described such conduct as a "palpable. . .violation of our own law (I mean the common
law, of which the law of nations is a part . . .)."0o Iredell either was

affirming the utterly uncontroversial opinion that an admiralty court
can apply the law of nations, or he was asserting that the common law,
not merely the law of nations, is federal law-a view the courts, of
course, later rejected.
The second case is The Nereide,10 5 a prize case in which a Spanish
shipper whose goods were aboard a British merchant vessel and were
captured by American privateers sought to argue that his property
could not lawfully be condemned as prize because Spain was neutral in
the fighting between the United States and Britain. The captors argued
that a treaty between the United States and Spain varied the rule of
the law of nations as to neutral goods and permitted Americans to seize
Spanish goods found on enemy vessels. The Court rejected this reading
of the treaty. The captors then argued that, regardless of how the treaty
was read by the United States, Spain in fact did not respect American
goods in circumstances like those presented in the case and, therefore,
urged the Court to retaliate by applying a similar rule to Spanish goods.
The Court refused to do so; Chief Justice Marshall characterized retaliation as a political, not a legal, decision, and held that, until Congress
legislated to change the rule of the law of nations protecting neutrals,
102. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
103. Four of the five justices delivered opinions in the case, and Justice Wilson refrained
from expressing an opinion because he had passed on the matter in the lower court. Id. at 168.
104. Id. at 161.
105. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
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"the court is bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of
the land."1 6 Clearly, Chief Justice Marshall meant no more than that
the law of nations was law that the Court was obliged to apply; because
the Court was sitting in admiralty, he was right. The case did not present the issue of whether the law of nations fell within the laws of the
United States; when that question did arise, in Canter, Marshall answered with a flat negative.
107
The third case is The Paquete Habana,'
containing the famous

statement that "[i]nternational law is part of our law." 0 8 Again, the
Court was sitting in admiralty. The issue of the Court's authority to
apply international law in a case based solely on the laws of the United
States simply was not presented by the case. Further, the case arose in
a statutory context in which Congress in effect directed the Court to
apply international law. Procedure in prize cases had been regulated
extensively by Congress. 10 9 Although the relevant legislation clearly assumed that vessels captured as prizes might not be properly condemnable, the legislation provided no standard whereby a prize court could
determine whether a given capture was lawful. The clear implication of
the legislation, therefore, was that the courts were to look to existing
sources of prize law-in this case, international law. Given the implicit
statutory directive and, as Professor Henkin 0 has recognized, the admiralty nature of a prize court's jurisdiction, The PaqueteHabana cannot be seen as addressing the place of customary international law in
American law cases in which the court has not been directed to apply it
by both the Constitution and a statutory scheme.
Of the two remaining cases, Hilton v. Guyot,"' was a diversity case
that discussed whether American courts were required to respect judgments rendered by courts of foreign countries. In the opening pages of
its opinion, the Court observed:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including not only
questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called
the law of nations; but also questions arising under what is usually called private
international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons
within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, .

.

. -is

part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the

courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man
and man, duly submitted to their determination.11
106. Id. at 423.
107. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
108. Id. at 700.
109. Prize Act, tit. 54, Rev. Stat. §§ 4613-4652 (1878).
110. Henkin, supra note 10, at 874 n.92. Professor Henkin is chief reporter of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
111. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
112. Id. at 163.
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The similarity between the language of Hilton and the frequently
quoted language from The Paquete Habana is not surprising, because
Hilton is the only authority cited in The Paquete Habana in support of
the proposition that international law is "part of our law." 113 Hilton,
however, does not strengthen the argument that customary international law is part of the laws of the United States. In the first place,
questions of enforcement of foreign judgments are understood by current law not to fall within the domain of public international law. Indeed, Hilton's use of the term "international law" to describe the
subject now labelled "conflicts of law" illustrates the dangers of assuming that nineteenth century courts using that term intended the same
meaning that a modern court would. Second, it was clear even at the
time Hilton was decided that questions about the enforcement of judgments were matters of general law, not federal questions. The case of
Huntington v. Attrill14 certainly asserts that proposition, and Huntington was decided only three years before Hilton. If anything, Hilton
read with Huntington illustrates that the Supreme Court may label a
subject "part of our law" without intending to suggest that it falls
within the "laws of the United States." In short, Hilton cannot be said
to further the argument that the law of nations is part of "the laws of
the United States."
The last case containing language that could be seen as bearing on
this subject, and one of the very few involving a construction of the
"take care" clause itself, is In re Neagle 5 The language is, however,
dictum. This case arose out of a bizarre state of facts, the essence of
which involved United States Deputy Marshal Neagle's killing of a person attacking Justice Stephen Field while Neagle was acting as bodyguard to Justice Field in California. Neagle had been assigned as Field's
bodyguard as part of his official duties; a plot against Field had become
a matter of public knowledge. Nonetheless, California authorities arrested Neagle for murder, and he sought a writ of habeas corpus from
the federal courts. The courts' authority to grant the writ was limited.
One of the circumstances justifying the issuance of a writ was that the
petitioner was in custody "in violation of the Constitution or of a law or
treaty of the United States." Because no statute authorized the use of
marshals as bodyguards, however, it was argued that no violation of
federal law was involved and that the federal courts had no authority to
grant the writ.
The Supreme Court, however, relied on the "take care" clause, ask113.
114.

175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
146 U.S. 657 (1892). See supra note 72.

115. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
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ing rhetorically whether the President's duty was limited to enforcing
statutes and treaties, or whether the duty included enforcing "the
rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our
international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of
the government under the Constitution?"11 6 The Court concluded that
this clause in fact empowered the President to protect federal judges
while in the course of their duties, and that the state's confining Neagle
for an act he performed as the President's agent in extending such protection was, therefore, in violation of the Constitution. Thus, the
Court's reference to "our international relations" had nothing at all to
do with the case before it and cannot be seen as authority for the proposition that the President's "take care" duties extend to international
law.
Two other cases, decided somewhat later than those previously dis17
cussed, deserve brief mention. In Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson
the Court described the status of admiralty law after the adoption of
the Constitution as being "the law of the United States."' 8 The later
case of Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum1' 9 quoted that language with approval. 120 Neither case, however, addressed the issue here
in question. Both were challenges to statutes alleged to deal unconstitutionally with an aspect of the admiralty jurisdiction. Johnson involved
the assertion that Congress had sought to remove a question from admiralty jurisdiction that could not be removed. The Thomas Barlum
involved the assertion that Congress had sought to add to admiralty
jurisdiction something that could not be included. In both cases, the
quoted language was used in the course of explaining the limits of Congress' power to legislate with respect to admiralty. The issue of the relation of the admiralty jurisdiction to the "laws of the United States"
jurisdictional grant was not presented. Indeed, the last time this question was presented, in Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 2 the Court relied expressly on Canter and squarely held that admiralty questions did not arise under the laws of the United States
within the meaning of section 1331 of Title 28.122
In sum, none of the cases from the relevant period, despite language apparently to the contrary, stand for the proposition that the
"law of nations" falls within the "laws of the United States" in the arti116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 64.
264 U.S. 375 (1924).
Id. at 386.
293 U.S. 21 (1934).
Id. at 43.
358 U.S. 354 (1959).
Id. at 359-81.
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cle III sense. All of the cases using that language were addressing quite
different issues; to apply their language to this issue is to distort their
meaning beyond recognition.
d. Opinions of Attorneys General
Aside from the opinions of the two United States attorneys general
discussed above, 2 3 three others issued during the nineteenth century
contain language supporting the proposition that the "take care" clause
obliges the President to adhere to customary international law. Of
course, such opinions are just that-opinions, albeit expressed by an
officer obliged by his office to be knowledgeable. As such, these opinions
lack the authority of judicial pronouncements, and to the extent they
contradict the cases discussed above, are simply wrong. Even ignoring
the weakness of these opinions as a source of law, however, a close examination of the opinions shows cause to be skeptical of each.
The first of these opinions, 2 4 propounded by Attorney General
Wirt in 1822, concerned a slave who had escaped from the Danish colony of St. Croix by stowing away aboard an American ship and was, at
the time the opinion was rendered, imprisoned by New York authorities
as a vagrant. The Danish minister had demanded the return of the
slave. Wirt expressed the opinion that the law of nations obliged the
United States to comply with the minister's demand. Addressing himself to the mechanism whereby that return could be accomplished, Wirt
argued that the laws of nations were among the laws of the United
States that the President was charged to enforce. This obligation, Wirt
stated, carried with it the power to carry out the obligation, giving the
President the authority simply to order the return of property that the
United States was bound to return, even if such orders would interrupt
judicial proceedings. Wirt went on to suggest that the President accomplish this objective by raising the question with the governor of New
12 5
York.
Wirt's opinion is clear; indeed the opinion is probably the most unequivocal, relatively authoritative assertion that the "take care" clause
applies to the law of nations. Nonetheless, it does not deal directly with
the problem addressed in this Article. Wirt treats the "take care" clause
as a source of power, not as a limitation upon power. Wirt does not deal
with the situation in which the President, exercising one of his other
constitutional functions, elects to act in a fashion arguably violative of
customary international law.
123.
124.
125.

See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566 (1822).
Id. at 568-71.
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The second relevant opinion is entitled to considerably less respect.
Issued in 1859 by Attorney General Black, 26 it dealt with the case of a
naturalized American who had emigrated from Hanover and who, upon
a visit to that state, was drafted into the army as a Hanoverian subject.
The Attorney General insisted that international law guaranteed the
right of expatriation. By refusing to acknowledge the new citizenship of
its former subject, therefore, Hanover was violating international law.
Black went on to assert that, even if the law of Hanover forbade expatriation, the law of nations would decide the conflict between the law of
Hanover and the law of the United States, under which the naturalization had taken place. Black added that any state's laws that affect the
interests of other states must be made and carried out according to the
127
law of nations.

Black's opinion is somewhat ambiguous. He may have meant to assert nothing more than that a state's international obligations are not
somehow avoided merely because its own law forbids meeting them.
This principle is a black-letter rule of international law, 128 and therefore is irrelevant to our problem. If Black meant to assert that international law controls even within a state's domestic legal system,
requiring a state in its internal workings to apply the rules of international law, he asserted something very different. If applied to the
United States, such a rule would in effect elevate international law to
superconstitutional status, controlling not merely statutes, but provisions of the Constitution. In response to this possibility, however, one
may point to the ambiguous character of the opinion and to the fact
that Black was addressing the responsibilities of Hanover, not those of
the United States. By no means is it clear that he would have been as
categorical if the subject had been whether an American statute had to
give way in the United States court system to the law of nations. Further, during this period, the United States was strongly advocating the
unlimited right to immigrate. 29 This last point alone renders the opinion somewhat suspect.
The last relevant opinion is even more dubious. Rendered in 1865,
it addressed the question of whether the assassins of President Lincoln
could be tried before a military tribunal, notwithstanding the fact that
they were civilians and that the courts of the District of Columbia,
where the crime was committed, were open. 130 Attorney General Speed
126.
127.

9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356 (1859).
Id. at 358-63.

128. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
137 (1987).
129. See 3 J. MOORE, A DIGEST 0P INTERNATIONAL LAW 571-76 (1906).

MATERALS

130.

11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297 (1865).

CASES AND
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asserted that the law of nations was part of the law of the land, that the
law of war was part of the law of nations, that under the law of war
military courts were the appropriate fora for trial of violations of that
law, and that the assassination, as a violation of the law of war, was
thus properly tried by a military tribunal.'3 Two observations suffice to
dispose of this opinion. First, its assimilation of the law of nations to
the laws of the United States was for the purpose of enhancing, not
limiting, executive authority. Second, its conclusion was wrong. The issue that the opinion addressed came before the Supreme Court in Ex
parte Milligan,3 2 which arose from the trial and condemnation by a
military tribunal in Indiana of certain persons accused of aiding the
Confederacy. Rejecting all arguments to the contrary, the Supreme
Court held that civilian American citizens could not be tried constitutionally by military authority in circumstances in which the civil courts
were open and functioning.138 The fact that Speed was incorrect in his
conclusion does not prove the falsity of his premises, but it certainly
counsels against excessive reliance on them. The need for caution is reinforced when the subject he was addressing is taken into account; perhaps the Attorney General was not terribly concerned about the
preliminary legal niceties required to hang Lincoln's killers.
Taken together, then, none of these opinions addressed either the
question whether the "take care" clause limited the authority of the
President to breach the law of nations or the question whether the law
of nations fell within article III's reference to the laws of the United
States. All addressed quite different subjects and sought to enhance,
not limit, the executive authority. Further, the correctness of at least
some of their conclusions on the points addressed is doubtful. These
opinions are, therefore, entitled to little weight in this analysis.
D. The Law of the United States: A Summary
The foregoing makes clear that, at least throughout the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, customary international law was not seen as
part of the law of the United States, as that term is used in article III of
the Constitution. As argued above, that conclusion in turn supports the
determination that customary international law was not among the laws
that the take care clause was intended to require the President to obey.
The current status of customary international law in the law of the
United States is uncertain.3 4 Perhaps customary international law can
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 299-313.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Id. at 127.
See infra notes 138-96 and accompanying text.
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now be considered federal common law."'5 If so, then customary international law may now be held to fall within the "laws of the United
States'13 6 for purposes of analyzing the jurisdiction of the courts. This

result may follow from Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,"7 a decision holding that questions turning on the federal common law that governs uses
of interstate waters "arise under" federal law for purposes of the statute granting the district courts subject matter jurisdiction in federal
question cases. Nothing in that opinion, however, purports to deal with
more than the jurisdiction of the courts. In particular, the opinion
lacked any suggestion of an intention to broaden the President's responsibilities. Absent such a suggestion, it appears reasonable to continue defining "laws" for purposes of the President's responsibilities in
the same way that the related term "laws of the United States" has
been defined for most of the history of this country. Changes in the
understanding of executive authority should not be deemed to flow by
implication from changes in the understanding of the authority of the
courts.
III.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW:
LIMITS ON LAWMAKING

The foregoing discussion explained why customary international
law is not among the laws that the President must take care to see
faithfully executed. Independent reasons, in any event, also prohibit the
courts from relying on customary international law as a basis for restraining the President. Part III discusses some of these limits. Subpart
A of Part III demonstrates that customary international law can be no
more than federal common law. In other words, customary international
law can enjoy no greater status in American law than other rules made
by federal judges. Subpart B makes clear that the arguments supporting the status of customary international law as federal common law are
weak and that customary international law does not fit within the limitations the Supreme Court generally has observed in creating federal
common law.

A.

Customary InternationalLaw-No More than Federal Common
Law
Subpart B demonstrates reason to doubt that customary international law has attained the status of federal common law, and recom135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(rev. ed. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT, THIRD].
136. See infra notes 138-96 and accompanying text.
137. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).

§§ 111, 112
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mends that customary international law should not be given that
status. First, however, another matter must be addressed. Some have
argued not only that customary international law is federal common
law, but also that customary international law is in some sense of higher
status than federal common law. Specifically, Professor Henkin has asserted that, as between a statute and a rule of customary international
law, the later in time controls. That is, for purposes of American domestic law, a newly emerged customary rule can displace an Act of Congress.1 8" Professor Henkin grounds this conclusion on the argument that
treaties and customary law are law of the United States because they
constitute binding international obligations of the United States, and
that since treaties and customary law are of equal status in international law, they must likewise be of equal status in American domestic
law.1"' International law differs from common law, he argues, in that
140
international law is "found," not created, by courts.
These assertions are incorrect, as is demonstrated by consideration
of both the cases dealing with the place of customary international law
in the hierarchy of American legal rules and the structure of that hierarchy itself. The analysis should begin with the assertion that customary international law is "part of our law." What, precisely, can that
phrase mean?
Purely as a matter of logic, that somewhat slippery phrase could
conceivably have any of three meanings. The phrase could mean that
United States lawmaking bodies determine the content of customary
international law-that customary international law is part of our law
in the sense that our legislation creates it. Alternatively, the phrase
could mean that American law is part of international law and controlled by international law in the same way that, within American law,
statutes are controlled by constitutional provisions. Finally, the phrase
could mean that customary international law is part of American law in
the sense that American lawmaking bodies make rules for use in our
own courts on the subjects covered by customary international law. The
rules on these subjects are not for the whole world, but only for
14
ourselves. '
Merely to state the first of these formulations is to reveal its falsity.
Subscribing to the first formulation would mean that the whole world is
bound by the international law determinations of the United States.
138. Henkin, supra note 10, at 878.
139. Id. at 877-78.
140. Id. at 876.
141. For a generally similar breakdown of the possible ways international law can fit into a
domestic legal system, see Sprout, Theories As To the Applicability of InternationalLaw in the
Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L LAW 280 (1932).
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While the United States certainly contributes to the creation of customary law, as do all states, the United States obviously does not dictate to
the world the content of international law.
The second formulation amounts to asserting that United States
law and international law form an integrated system, with domestic law
subordinated to international law. This meaning is also necessarily incorrect, given the place of treaties and executive agreements in American law. In international law, the United States is bound not only by
those agreements ratified by the President by and with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate-"treaties," as the term is used in
American domestic law-but also by agreements concluded by the President on his own authority, without congressional action. 42 When such
agreements are binding in international law, they retain that international law status without regard to their status in domestic law. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that a treaty may be superseded in
domestic law by a subsequently enacted statute, notwithstanding that a
United States refusal to apply the treaty would breach an international
legal obligation. 14 The Supreme Court has never addressed the relative
status of agreements concluded by the President solely on his own authority and federal statutes, but one circuit court has held that, for purposes of domestic law, statutes necessarily control such agreements
without regard to priority in time., 4 These judicial pronouncements
necessarily mean that when otherwise constitutional American legislation violates American international obligations, whether these obligations are derived from treaty or executive agreement, the violation is
irrelevant for purposes of applying that legislation domestically. Moreover, this conclusion necessarily means that international law does not
control domestic law in the United States. Otherwise, legislation violating international obligations would be void, just as legislation violating
constitutional restraints is void.
What remains then is the third possible formulation: That international law is part of the law of the United States in the sense that
American lawmaking bodies develop rules on the subjects addressed by
international law, and that these rules are binding not on the whole
world, but only within the United States. 145 Assuming that this formu142. See generally McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executiveor Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pt. 1), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 261-82
(1945) (listing many agreements concluded by the President both with Congressional sanction and
on his independent authority).
143. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600
(1881).
144. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953).
145. For a more thorough analysis, reaching the same conclusion, see Sprout, supra note 141.

1988]

EXECUTIVE BRANCH

1237

lation is the rule in the United States, one must consider the power of
those American lawmaking bodies in evaluating the argument that customary international law is, within the American legal system, the
equivalent of federal statutes.
The most important case to do so is Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.146
That case does more than reject the existence of a general federal common law. The reasoning Erie uses to support its result dictates a particular way of thinking about the authority of the federal courts. Erie
rejects the notion that law can exist without being derived from some
definite authority; rather, Erie holds that all law takes its force from
the authority of the institution that promulgates it. That is, whatever a
particular court's reasons for adopting a rule that is not based on a statute or a constitutional provision, that rule counts as law not because of
the reasons the court gives for relying on it, but simply because the
court holds that the rule is law. Correspondingly, the force of a common-law rule depends on the authority of the court that adopted it. If
the court lacks authority to promulgate the rule, as the federal courts
lacked authority to promulgate a general common law in Erie, then the
rule is void. Moreover, if an institution is competent to promulgate
rules only in certain circumstances, then those rules necessarily apply
only in those circumstances. Finally, Erie makes clear that only one
source can authorize lawmaking by federal courts: The Constitution.
This approach to the authority of the federal courts necessarily requires rejection of Professor Henkin's arguments regarding the place of
customary international law in American law. He asserts, in effect, that
customary international law is binding without any action by American
institutions because the courts in applying it simply discover a rule they
are required by some exterior source to apply. Erie, however, clearly
rejects the very concept of such external authorities. Rather, Erie necessarily stands for the proposition that law can exist in the United
States only as constitutionally developed by legislatures and courts, and
that this law exists only to the extent that such bodies promulgate it.
When an American court applies a rule of international law as a rule of
decision, that international law rule is law in the United States only
because that court is authorized to make it so. Treaties and customary
law are not, as Henkin asserts, law in the United States because they
are international obligations of the United States. As Erie makes clear,
they are law in the United States because and to the extent they are
made law by the Constitution, or by Congress, or by the courts. To say
that courts "find" customary international law is to confuse the technique the judge uses to determine the rule with the essence of the rule's
146. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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authoritativeness; the rule's authority flows not from the sources upon

which the judge relies, but from the judge.
Indeed, one need not rely on deductions from Erie for this proposition. The Court made this proposition explicit in admiralty cases decided sixty years before Erie. As noted in Part

11,147

the Court expressly

held in The Lottawanna that the general maritime law, as discoverable
from the practice of all states, was law in the United States only to the
extent it was adopted in the United States; the fact that a rule adopted
in the United States might be an incorrect statement of such general
law was irrelevant, for what controlled in this country was not the general law itself, but whatever version of it American institutions applied. 4 8 Again, as noted above, 4 9 the Court took the same position in
the Western Maid case, rejecting the existence of some "mystic overlaw to which even the United States must bow."' 50 To be sure, these
cases dealt with maritime law, not customary international law, but
that distinction makes no difference on these facts. The Lottawanna
asserts that its formulation applies also to international law and the
laws of war, 15 ' and every argument that could be made for the "mystic
over-law" status of customary international law could equally have been
asserted for maritime law in these two cases. Neither case denied the
existence of a general maritime law, nor rejected the possibility of discovering its content by examining the practice of other states.
Any argument based on either the importance of the law of nations
to the Framers or the need for unified determinations of the law of nations necessarily applies to maritime law no less than to customary international law, because both were considered part of the law of nations
at the time the Constitution was written. Indeed, one can make a
stronger argument that maritime law is binding in the United States
without action by American authorities than that customary international law is similarly binding. This conclusion follows from the constitutional grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. This grant of
jurisdiction implies that the Framers believed that some law existed to
be applied in the exercise of such jurisdiction, but in 1789 this law
could only have been general law. Of course, there is no equivalent express jurisdictional grant for customary international law.
In short, the cases make impossible the assertion that international
law can be law in this country by reason of some power other than that
possessed by American institutions. International law can be law in the
147. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
148. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572 (1874).
149. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
150. In re Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922).
151. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall. ) 558, 572 (1874).
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United States only to the extent that the institutions that adopt it are
empowered to make it law. If a court adopts a rule of customary international law as a rule of decision, then that rule is law only to the extent that the courts are empowered to make law. And the limits on the
lawmaking powers of the federal courts necessarily restrict the extent to
which those courts can apply international law to override a statute.
The Supreme Court has expressly addressed the question of the
federal courts' power to create common law on a subject after Congress
has legislated on the subject. The Court has held that when Congress
legislates on a subject the courts lose power to develop a common law
that would supplant the legislation, even regarding subjects on which
the courts have previously claimed the authority to make common
law. 152 Indeed, the Court has held that once Congress legislates as to a
part of a subject, assuming that the rest of the subject would continue
to be governed by a particular common-law rule, courts lose the power
to alter even that common-law rule.1 53
The proper conclusion, then, is to reject the notion that international law must be seen in the United States as having higher status
than federal common law, even assuming that international law ranks
as federal common law. The opposite view cannot be reconciled either
with Erie's explanation of the source and limits on federal courts' lawmaking power, or with the general limitations on the creation of federal
common law.
B. Is Customary InternationalLaw Federal Common Law?
Sections 111 and 112 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Restatement) assert that customary international law is federal common law.' That is, customary international law is part of the body of law that falls within the federal
question jurisdiction, but does not involve application or interpretation
of either the Constitution or federal statutes. Rather, its content is determined by decisions of the federal courts. The discussion below
shows, however, severe weaknesses in the Restatement's position. First,
authority does not support this position. Second, the subjects on which
the Supreme Court has made federal common law are, with one uncertain exception, 5 5 all subjects as to which the Supreme Court has had
152. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963).
153. See Edmonds v. Compagfiie G~n6rale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271-73 (1979). Because the federal courts cannot refuse to apply a statute in order to apply a common-law rule,
international law-a mere element of the federal common law-likewise cannot supplant a statute.
154. RESTATEMENT, THIRD, supra note 135, §§ 111, 112.
155. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
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ultimate lawmaking authority since the first days of the Republic; the
Supreme Court had no such ultimate authority regarding customary international law.
Analysis of the general question of the status of international law
in federal law necessarily starts with the Restatement's rationale for its
conclusion. That the authority cited does not support the Restatement's position is immediately apparent. The only authority the Restatement lists 156 is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 57 which can
at best be described as suggestive. The crucial jurisdictional issue was
not present in the case, and the Court noted that issue only to the extent of stating that the Court was not addressing it.1 58 Nor does the
Court's treatment of the merits advance the Restatement's position.
The case dealt with the act of state doctrine: the rule that, under certain circumstances, American courts will not pass on the legality of the
acts of foreign governments. The Court clearly held that whether the
doctrine was applied was a matter of federal, not state, law.15 9 In doing
so, however, the Court characterized the issue as "concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and
the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community." 16 0 Necessarily, apportionment of
authority in the United States between the judges and the President
must be a matter of American domestic law, not international law.
Moreover, saying that an issue involving the implications of presidential
authority is governed by federal law is clearly a long way from saying
that customary international law is federal law.
Although Sabbatino is weak authority, proponents of the Restatement's conclusion might point to the Court's justification for its conclusion that application of the act of state doctrine must be a matter of
federal law. The Court stressed the importance of avoiding the divergence of judicial opinions and parochialism in matters affecting international relations, and quoted with apparent approval Judge Jessup's
cautions against extending the Erie doctrine to international law.161
These factors arguably justify treating international law as a matter of
federal law, just as the act of state doctrine is treated.
These arguments, however, are weaker than they appear. First of
all, questions concerning the application of the act of state doctrine can
arise only in cases in which foreign acts of state are in issue; thus these
156.

RESTATEMENT, THIRD,

157. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
158. Id. at 421 n.20.
159. Id. at 425.

160. Id.
161. Id.

supra note 135, § 111 reporter's note 3.
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questions necessarily raise risks of foreign policy complications, which
in turn raise questions regarding which agencies of government should
address those risks. In essence, the Sabbatino court saw itself faced
with a question of "who's in charge," and resolved that question. Obviously, leaving open the possibility of the state courts giving divergent
answers to that question would mean both that the issue had not been
resolved and that the apparently clear constitutional scheme of allocating control of foreign affairs to the federal government had been
ignored.
All issues of international law clearly do not present similar dangers. For example, whether officials of an American state can arrest a
suspected non-American drug smuggler on the sea outside American
territorial waters is an issue of, among other things, international law.
Even if the suspect's home nation objected to a state court's resolution
of that issue, however, such a case would be unlikely to create the same
kind of difficulties as would be created by a questioning of the legality
of a foreign state's own acts. History also provides some perspective on
this issue. After all, tremendous concern existed at the time of the
framing of the Constitution about state judicial failures to properly apply international law.162 Yet, as the discussion in Part H demonstrates,
that concern was not thought in 1789 to require treating international
law as something on which the federal courts must have the last word.
That the importance of this subject has so increased over the last 200
years as to require a different approach is by no means clear.
Sabbatino, then, does not hold that customary international law is
federal common law, and neither does history support that proposition.
Furthermore, this position suffers from an additional problem. This position depends on the assumption that all which is needed to permit the
federal courts to fashion common law on a subject is the conclusion that
the subject is "federal"-not properly controlled by state law. This assumption, however, is false.
The Supreme Court has never held that a grant of authority to the
political branches to deal with a subject is enough to permit the Court
to frame common-law rules on that subject, even if federal authority is
exclusive of the states.16 For example, the commerce clause has never
162. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
163. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). That case held only that "federal
common law" is "federal law" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). Id. at 98-101. It did not address
the question of how federal common law is created. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee extended previous decisions recognizing a federal common-law rule governing regulation of interstate waters to
cover water pollution, but did not create a body of law from scratch. Moreover, the federal law of
interstate waters as developed fits the pattern described for the third category of federal common
law discussed below: (1) It was developed in cases between states-an explicit article III heading of
jurisdiction; (2) it was a subject on which the law of no one state could govern, see Hinderlider v.
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been used to justify a federal common law of interstate commerce.16 4
Rather, the Court has engaged in common-law rulemaking only in much
more limited circumstances.
Preliminarily, a definition of what is meant in this context by
"common-law rulemaking" is helpful. As used here, the term is applied
to the creation or limitation of a right to recover in circumstances when
no statute or constitutional provision purports to create or limit such a
right. While the subject of federal common law is murky,

5

and sharp

categorizations are suspect, federal common law apparently can be broken down into four broad groupings.
First are those groups of rules developed by the courts in response
to Congress' apparent intent that federal law generally govern a particular subject even though Congress has regulated only portions of that
subject by legislation or by treaty. Most, if not all, of these cases involve
situations in which the congressional intent is not seen as indicating
what the content of a particular federal rule should be, but only that
the rule-whatever the rule is-be determined by federal law. An obvious example is the category of cases in which the federal courts deduced
their authority to frame rules of decision from the enactment of statutes that conferred jurisdiction to deal with subjects on which Congress
had possessed but not exercised the power to frame substantive law.166
Another example is provided by Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,1' 7 in
which the Court inferred the existence of a federal common law of
water pollution from the numerous congressional enactments dealing
with interstate waters and with pollution, none of which, however, pur168
ported to regulate the subject in question.

The second category of federal common-law rules focuses on the
implications, not of congressional action, but of the Constitution itself.
The federal courts have crafted rules in this second category to deal
with situations in which the Constitution is thought to require, by imLa Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); and, (3) the Supreme Court had
control of the matter through its exclusive original jurisdiction in state versus state cases.
164. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
98-99 (1980).
165. This subject is one on which much has been written. See generally P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1973); M. REDISH, supra note 164, at 79-107; Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of

Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-andof the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964); Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024 (1967); Mishkin, The Variousness of
"FederalLaw". Competence and Discretionin the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
166. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
167. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
168. Id. at 101-08.
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plication, a particular result in legal proceedings in which Congress has
not acted to bring about that result. This group of rules seems limited
to issues involving limitations on the power of the state governments
vis-&vis the federal government, or on the power of the federal government, or on the power of one of its branches. The Court has not created
rules purporting to govern the conduct of society at large simply on the
basis of the implications of the Constitution. Examples of this category
of rules include Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,1'6 9 creating a private right of action for persons
whose fourth amendment rights were violated by federal officers; Sabbatino, ° limiting the authority of federal and state judges to take actions that might interfere with conduct of foreign policy by the political
branches; and the cases establishing immunities for individual federal
officials from state court suits grounded on actions that the officials
took in the course of their duties.' 7 ' To repeat, in all these cases, the
Constitution implicitly requires a particular legal outcome: That federal
officials not violate the fourth amendment, for example, or that the
states not second-guess the federal government in the form of state
suits against federal officials for actions taken in the course of duty.
Given these constitutional requirements, the courts have framed claims
and defenses to implement them, despite the absence of congressional
action or express constitutional warrant for judicial activity.
In the third category of cases, both Congress and the Constitution
have indicated a desire that the federal courts address the issues involved, but have provided no particular indication of the desired outcomes. Three identifying characteristics mark each case in this
category. First, these cases fall under express jurisdictional grants, exclusive of "arising under" jurisdiction contained in article III. Second,
since 1789 Congress has implemented those grants regarding all these
subjects either by giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of the
subject, or by vesting in the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear appeals
on the subject from the state courts. Finally, in all these cases, the subjects on which the federal courts have framed law would have been
held, under the system of Swift v. Tyson, 172 to fall in the domain of
general law. As indicated above, federal courts seeking to determine
general law during the reign of Swift v. Tyson analysis were not expected to defer to the courts of any particular locality. The effect of a
combined constitutional and congressional grant to the Supreme Court
169.
170.
171.
172.

403 U.S. 388 (1971).
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
See, e.g., Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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of ultimate appellate authority on such general law subjects was, therefore, that the Court became empowered to determine the appropriate
public policy on such subjects.
This third group of subjects falling within the federal common law
17 4
includes admiralty"'3 cases involving interstate boundaries and waters
and cases in which the federal government acts as a participant in
transactions rather than as a regulator of them. 7" Each category is the
subject of an explicit jurisdictional grant in article III. Moreover, all
these subjects are ones over which the Supreme Court has actually had
control since 1789, either through Congress' vesting exclusive jurisdiction over the subject in the federal courts, or through Congress' permitting appeals on the subject from the state courts to the Supreme Court.
Examining the Judiciary Act of 1789 bears out this observation. Section
9 vests exclusive original admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the
federal district courts.17 1 Section 13 vests in the Supreme Court exclu77
sive original jurisdiction over cases in which states sue other states;
necessarily, this class of cases will include many that present disputes
over state boundaries or control of interstate waters. Section 22 gives
the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review decisions of the circuit courts
upon a writ of error, which procedure would have permitted the Court
to review cases in which the United States was a party." 8 Section 25
gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to re-examine on writs of error
cases decided by the state courts in which
is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised
under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is
drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any
State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity,. . . or where
is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a
treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision
is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party ...179

This language is surely broad enough to reach any case in which
the United States is litigating in a state court, and will also reach cases
in which issues of state boundaries or control of water are raised, although the federal nature of those questions may not have been apparent in 1789.180 With respect to these areas, then, the final authority
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See, e.g., The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
See, e.g., Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 92.
See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 38, § 9, at 76-77.
Id., § 13, at 80.
Id., § 22, at 84.
Id., § 25, at 85-86.
Apparently, the Supreme Court first squarely held to this effect regarding waters in
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since 1789 has been the Supreme Court. Not only does article III envisage this scheme, in permitting the Supreme Court to have appellate jurisdiction on these subjects, but the vision has also been realized
through jurisdictional legislation.
Additionally, all three of these subjects fall within the "general
law." As discussed at length in Part II, admiralty clearly fell within the
area of general law. Questions of interstate boundaries and waters necessarily cannot be resolved on the basis of the law of any one state, as
the Court held in Hinderliderv. La PlataRiver & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co. 18 1 Finally, the Court has applied federal common law to cases involving the United States as a participant in circumstances in which the
subject in question was a general law subject. Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States,'8 2 for example, involved negotiable paper-a subject
that was seen as covered by general law as early as the Swift case.1'8
When the Supreme Court has been asked to develop federal common
law under this third category on subjects that in 1789 would have been
84
local law, the Court has generally backed off.
Thus, with respect to all subjects in this third category of federal
common law, the Supreme Court has been applying jurisdiction specifically provided for in article III. In each of these jurisdictional areas,
ultimate Supreme Court appellate authority on a matter not subject to
"local law" presumably implies a constitutional and congressional decision that the states should defer to the Court on these subjects-a decision that justified not simply developing a federal rule distinct from
that of the states, but requiring the states to adhere to the federal rule.
In short, on all these subjects the Constitution and the Congress in
their jurisdictional grants have absolutely and unambiguously indicated
that the Supreme Court is to determine the law.
The fourth and final category in which the Supreme Court has created federal common law involves cases in which the proprietary interHinderlider,decided in 1938. 304 U.S. at 110-11. Presumably, the issue had not reached the Court
earlier. Similarly, the boundary issue apparently did not reach the Court until 1916. Cissna v.
Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 295 (1918).
181. 304 U.S. at 110.
182. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
183. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
184. For example, in Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363 (1977), the Court overruled Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), which had
held that federal common law governed questions regarding the effect of a river's movement on
title to the riverbed. The Court explained the overruling by observing that Bonelli's reliance on
Borax, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), as to the applicability of federal law, had
been misplaced. Borax, according to the Court, had applied federal common law on a much narrower basis than did Bonelli. Further, the Court held that Bonelli had ignored a line of cases
indicating that issues of the sort in question were properly questions of state law. Corvallis, 429
U.S. at 376-77.
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ests of the federal government are at stake, although private persons
are the actual litigants in the suit. This category includes only the very
recent case of Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,185 that established
an immunity from state tort suits for persons contracting with the
United States, at least in some circumstances. 88 In that case, the Court
deduced its authority to create federal common law by analogy to the
cases that applied federal common law to the proprietary interests of
the United States and established immunities for federal officers. The
justification for the result in Boyle was the federal interest in avoiding
the difficulties in procurement that would arise if the federal government wished to purchase equipment with features that could give rise
to liability under state tort law.187 The Court limited the immunity to
situations in which the equipment was not an off-the-shelf model, but
rather had been designed according to federal specifications; only in
such a case, the Court held, was there a possibility of a significant conflict between state law and a federal function, because application of
tort law in such a case could inhibit the discretion of federal officials
seeking a design which, in their judgment, best met the government's
needs. "88
'
While this discussion may appear disjointed, a unifying principle
that ties together the first three categories of federal common law does
seem to emerge. In all cases, some authority other than that of the
courts has created a situation requiring a federal rule of law in circumstances in which only the courts can supply a rule. In the first category,
Congress has indicated a desire to occupy a subject, but has left gaps
that require filling. In the second, the Constitution demands a particular outcome, but Congress has failed to legislate to obtain that outcome.
In the third, both Constitution and Congress have required the courts
to hear cases that state law cannot control, but have provided them no
rules of decision, thereby forcing the courts to devise the rules.
Given this breakdown of the types of federal common law, where
does customary international law fit? Obviously, the first category is irrelevant; this category is not a subject on which Congress has legislated.
Nor is the second category relevant. The Constitution has no implicit
requirements regarding particular outcomes on the merits in cases involving customary international law. To be sure, as Sabbatino819 clearly
holds, the Constitution requires that the states not interfere with the
conduct of foreign policy under the rubric of applying international law
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

56 U.S.L.W. 4792 (U.S. June 27, 1988).
Id. at 4793-96.
Id. at 4793-94.
Id. at 4795-96.
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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in their courts, but this matter is quite different from the one at issue.
Nor can customary international law fall within the third category of
federal common law. While customary international law is, of course, a
subject falling within "general law," it is clearly not a subject which
either the Constitution, through an express jurisdictional grant, or the
Congress, through grants of appellate jurisdiction, intended to be controlled by the Supreme Court. Applying the unifying principle, no authority outside the courts has required them to act; there remain no
gaps to be filled, no outcomes to be ensured, and no grants of jurisdiction to be implemented. Customary international law, in short, does not
show the hallmarks of the first three types of federal common law.19 0
190. It might be argued that, despite the arguments in the text, the federal courts must be
able to implement rules of customary international law in cases not involving the Executive, and
that an argument that they cannot do so proves too much. Granting such a need, it does not follow
that the need must be met by calling customary international law "federal common law." Whether
that step is needed depends on the actual limits on the ability of the federal courts to determine
the content of customary international law and the likelihood of state court interference in the
process.
In considering the actual situation, it first can be argued that, whatever the intended scope of
the Alien Tort Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982), the power of Congress over international commerce and the power granted by the "define and punish" clause, U.S.

CONST.,

art. I, § 8, cl. 10,

amply sustain that statute, assuming it is read, as it may be, as a direction to the federal courts to
apply international law in the cases it covers. For a similar approach, see Casto, The Federal
Courts Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
CONN. L. REv. 467, 510-22 (1986); Paust, Book Review, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 227, 232 n.23 (1981). On
the theory cited in the text, the Alien Tort Claim Act would arguably be more easily defended
than the statutes involved in either Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
or Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), because the Alien Tort Claim Act
can be read as expressly providing a rule of decision for the courts if the Act's reference to the law
of nations is seen as a direction to the courts to rely on that body of law. The statutes upheld in
Lincoln Mills and Verlinden contain no such references to a body of law. Since an alien plaintiff
could sue under the Act in federal court if he chose, while a defendant could remove a case within
the Act to federal court if the alien commenced it in a state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982),
getting such suits into federal court is not difficult if either party wants a federal determination.
Also, the statute apparently permits suits against anyone. While the political question doctrine,
the act of state doctrine, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1982), may limit application of the Alien Tort Claim Act, compare Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. C.V. 82-1772-RMT (MCx), slip op. at 2-3 (C.D. Cal. filed March 7, 1985) with Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.
Ct. 1466 (1988), such limitations would presumably apply equally to claims based on customary
international law seen as federal common law. It would appear that any suit by an alien for international law torts cognizable in American courts could be heard under this statute. Thus, federal
jurisdiction in suits by aliens for tortious international law violations does not require reliance on
nonstatutory authorized federal common law.
A second possible group of suits would be those against foreign governments brought by
Americans or by aliens with nontort claims. In such cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 grants jurisdiction to
the federal trial courts for all claims on which the foreign state cannot claim sovereign immunity.
Cases in which sovereign immunity are available will not be resolved on the basis of substantive
law, no matter who devises the substantial law. Thus, the existence of § 1330 at least guarantees
that a federal court can hear all the cases in which the occasion to apply customary international
law to a foreign state defendant could arise.
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Admittedly, the fourth category of federal common law represented
by the Boyle case does not fit the "external authority" model. No authority external to the court has created a situation either requiring a
particular outcome to Boyle type suits or requiring the Court to address
such suits without providing a rule of law for the courts to apply. While
this fact casts doubt on the correctness of the decision,191 it provides no
This statute does not contain the Alien Tort Claim Act's express reference to international
law. However, the federal interest in the subject would arguably justify also reading § 1330 as a
direction to the federal courts to develop international law to the extent it applied. Again, removal
can ensure that foreign state defendants are in federal rather than state courts.
Yet a third group of suits would be those by or against the United States government, or
against its officials in their official capacity. Here, either the United States would be a party or, if
the party were nominally a particular official, the interests of the United States clearly would be
implicated. Given the article III grant of jurisdiction in cases in which the United States is a party,
and the Clearfieldprecedent for developing federal common law when analogous important interests of the federal government are involved, there is also a basis here for the federal courts' application of international law without seeking to derive a federal common-law grant from the federal
question language of article III. Again, the political question doctrine might apply, but that doctrine would apply no matter what the source of rules the courts applied.
The only suits not covered by any of the foregoing categories are those by Americans, foreign
governments, or aliens with nontort claims against someone other than the United States, a United
States government official, or a foreign government. While several of these cases could be brought
in federal court under the diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), a federal court deciding the
case would apply state law (assuming customary international law is not held to be federal common law), and state court decisions would not be reviewable by the Supreme Court. This result,
however, is not necessarily fatal. The subject matter of such suits is hard to imagine; it seems
doubtful, however, that these suits could involve crucial issues of international law. Whether much
harm would come from letting the states develop the rules of law in such cases is unclear. At least
the likelihood of harm in this last class of cases is not so obvious as to justify the constitutionally
risky step of having the federal courts proclaim a new area of federal common law without either
constitutional or statutory sanction.
191. The problem with the Boyle case is that the Court's majority never really explained why
the belief that a given rule would be a good rule empowers the federal courts to create that rule. Of
course, the Court's other federal common-law cases were very often silent on the source of the
Court's power to act, but those other cases fit the model expounded in the text; the Court in those
cases could plausibly have pointed to the implications of either congressional action, constitutional
language, or both as compelling the Court to act. Since such sources of compulsion are absent in
Boyle, the Court would have simplified its holding if it had more clearly justified its result. Certainly the reasons advanced by Justice Scalia are no justification.
While it may be true that state tort law applied in the Boyle setting could force the government to pay higher prices for its purchases than it would otherwise pay, any element of state law
could drive up federal outlays. Defense contractors presumably pay state taxes, thus driving up the
prices the government pays; does this mean the Court could set state tax rates? State laws regulating testamentary dispositions or family matters could make residence in the state unattractive to
persons who might otherwise apply for federal jobs there, forcing the government to either increase
salaries to attract workers or rearrange its operations in a possibly costly way. In such a case, could
the federal courts set aside such state rules and invent their own? To be sure, the Court expressly
stated that the fact that a state rule might drive up federal costs does not alone justify substitution
of a federal rule; the Court held that a "significant conflict" with a federal policy or interest is also
required. Again, however, the Court's explanation of what counts as a significant conflict was
opaque. Such a conflict was said to exist if a state rule interferes with discretionary decisions by
federal officials. The Court's explanation of what counts as a discretionary decision, however, was
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support to an argument that customary international law is federal
common law. The Boyle type of suit involves only cases touching on the
federal government's proprietary activities; customary international law
obviously has nothing to do with the government as a participant in the
market. Further, the core of Boyle's rationale is the Court's desire to
protect the discretion of federal officials from even indirect interference
by state tort rules. A case aimed at enhancing governmental discretion
is weak authority for the proposition that federal common law includes
rules of customary law that would limit such discretion. Thus, even this
new category of federal common law cannot be seen as including customary international law.
Relying on the federal common law to control executive discretion
to the degree suggested by some would be taking the courts beyond
areas sanctioned by precedent. To be sure, federal courts have limited
the executive without express congressional authorization, but only in
much different circumstances. Clearfield can in a sense be seen as a
case imposing constraints on the Executive, but in that case the Executive was involved as a participant in a transaction, not as a regulator of
public policy. 19 2 Other cases limiting the Executive likewise involve the
Executive as a participant, 93 except for the cases in which the Court
most unclear. The exercise of discretion, said the Court, can be identified if the product that is the
basis of suit was manufactured according to government specifications, rather than simply being
selected off-the-shelf by a government official. Boyle, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4795. But what about the
official who, in exercising his discretion, decides to save time and money by ordering off-the-shelf
rather than devising his own specifications? Would not his discretion somehow be affected if the
prices of off-the-shelf items were driven up by state tort law rules? Indeed, consider the examples
given in this footnote. Surely the discretion of officials is affected when they know that they must
pay more to deal with contractor X than with contractor Y because X operates in a high tax state.
The limiting principle is thus quite befuddling, and appears not to be much of a limit.
The rule of Boyle, in short, could be used to set aside almost any provision of state law. The
Court has never claimed to have such power. Justice Scalia needed either to give the basis for such
a claim of power or explain why the rule he crafted was not such a claim. He did neither.
192. Further, rules of the Clearfield type cannot be seen as actually limiting executive discretion, since they serve to provide a framework within which discretion can be exercised in circumstances in which the absence of a framework would preclude action. Clearfield itself, for example,
could be seen as limiting executive discretion by imposing a duty on the government, when a bank
has presented for payment a United States government check on which an endorsement has been
forged, to give notice of forgery within a reasonable time if greater delay would damage the bank.
Any rule the Court promulgated on the subject, however, would have limited executive discretion
in the same way, except for a rule that the United States has no duties whatever to persons dealing
with its commercial paper. Such absolute license to the United States would, practically at least,
limit executive discretion, because it would increase the risk of dealing in United States paper so
greatly so as to impede the financial operations of the government. The government needed some
rule legally binding on itself to give itself the credibility needed to engage in the transactions in
which it sought to engage. In this sense Clearfield was empowering, not limiting.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (United States as
lender and loan guarantor); United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970) (United States as
contractor).
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had much stronger reason to believe that the Constitution and the Congress had intended for the Executive to be controlled than would be
true in the case of customary international law. For example, in The
Paquete Habana, the Court certainly limited the Executive acting in
his sovereign capacity. The Court did so, however, against the background of both the express admiralty jurisdictional grant in the Constitution and the action of Congress in heavily regulating prize law. 1 94 The
authority for applying customary international law is not comparable.
This line of reasoning exposes the problem with Professor Kirgis'
suggestion that some elements of customary international law can be
self-executing, and thus automatically binding on the Executive. 195 His
argument ignores the point explained above: That after Erie, the promulgation of rules of common law clearly amounts to legislation by
courts, and thus the courts' power to promulgate rules is limited by the
general limits on their authority. As just discussed, the courts have not
relied on federal common law to limit Executive discretion without relatively explicit constitutional and congressional direction. This stance
means, in effect, that there can be no "self-executing custom." This
conclusion follows because in context "self-executing custom" would refer to a common-law rule that federal courts could use to control executive discretion without such constitutional and congressional direction.
As explained above, the creation of such rules is without precedent.
In sum, examining the argument that customary international law
is federal common law reveals that the Restatement's authority for its
assertion to that effect is weak and that customary international law
does not share basic characteristics of the subjects in which the Supreme Court has made federal common law. Further, neither precedent
nor basis in constitutional language and congressional action supports
the Courts' control of the Executive to the extent suggested by the Restatement. To say the least, all these factors counsel caution in accepting the idea that customary international law is federal common
law.

196

194.
195.
196.

See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
Kirgis, supra note 10, at 372.
Judge Jessup apparently disagreed with this view. In a 1939 "editorial comment," he

expressed the view that Erie should not be interpreted as obliging the federal courts to defer to the
courts of the states in matters of international law, which he believed to be a part of federal common law. Jessup, The Doctrineof Erie Railroad v. Tomkins Applied to InternationalLaw, 33 AM.
J. INT'L LAW 740 (1939). His argument, however, has several weaknesses. He relied on the language
from The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1894),
and The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815). See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying
text. He did not, however, take note of the difficulties discussed in this Article in applying those
cases outside their own contexts. He stressed the policy difficulties presented by, in effect, conced-

ing to the state courts' control of this subject. He also asserted that the United States is obliged as

"4an international person" to apply international law in its courts, but gave neither authority for
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Any conclusions on this subject are perhaps speculative, given the
lack of Supreme Court precedent. When the issue is sharpened, however, to focus on the relative competence of the Executive and the judiciary in areas implicating foreign relations, much more judicial guidance
is available. Part IV addresses that topic.

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND THE

SEPARATION

OF

POWERS

The foregoing discussion has presented a number of arguments
against the proposition that the courts can compel the President to adhere to international law. First, it is doubtful that international law
should be included among the laws that the President is to faithfully
execute. Second, and aside from the first point, if international law is in
some sense federal law-a debatable proposition-international law is
at best only federal common law. There is simply no precedent authorizing the courts to control the discretion of the political branches on the
basis of federal common law.
Aside from these two arguments, a third focuses on the separation
of powers. The subject matter of international law is primarily the relations between independent states. The judiciary's requiring the President to adhere to international law, therefore, amounts to controlling
his discretion with respect to the foreign policy of the United States. As
Part IV demonstrates, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
judiciary is without power to substitute its judgment for that of the
Executive in the realm of foreign policy. In some cases, this result has
been grounded on the argument that a particular question was beyond
judicial competence. In other cases, similar results have been reached
by recognizing the Executive's authority to prescribe a rule of decision. In either case, the result has been the same: The courts do not
interfere with Executive decisions in the area of foreign policy.
Before developing this argument, a preliminary objection must be
met. The position put forward in Part IV is related to the political
question doctrine,"s yet the famous case of Baker v. Carrl 99 observed
that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
this assertion nor consideration to the suspect character of such an "obligation" in the American
constitutional scheme. Jessup, supra, at 743. Judge Jessup's position, in short, seems grounded
primarily on the undesirability of the federal courts' deferring to the states on matters of international law, and does not appear to reflect a thorough examination of the objections to his
conclusions.
197. See infra notes 212-74 and accompanying text.
198. The text does not simply label these subjects "political questions" because, with regard
to some of them, the Court does not assert the nonexistence of a rule of decision, but rather recognizes the Executive's authority to create a rule binding the courts.
199. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."2 0 0 This statement
may appear to support the objection that this Article seeks to apply the
political question doctrine to a subject to which the Supreme Court has
stated the doctrine does not apply.
This objection fails. Baker clearly sought to assert only that not all
cases involving foreign relations were political questions; the case did
not go to the other extreme of claiming that no case involving foreign
relations could fall into the political category. This conclusion follows
from an examination of the language of the case. The Court observed,
for example, that efforts to resolve foreign relations issues "frequently
turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise
of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature;
but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of
the Government's views."2 0 1 Further, the Court's discussion distinguished a number of foreign relations cases it perceived as presenting
political questions from others it saw as presenting no such questions.
The common thread running through the Court's analysis was deference to unambiguous executive or congressional action. Thus, the Court
will defer to "governmental action" on the question whether a treaty is
terminated, addressing the matter itself only if no conclusive governmental action is taken. The Court defers to the Executive on matters of
recognition of states, territorial claims, existence of belligerency abroad,
diplomatic status, and sovereign immunity, using its own judgment only
to construe actions by the Executive. 0 In short, Baker is clearly consistent with the view that cases which would require the judiciary to control executive discretion in foreign affairs matters present insuperable
separation of powers problems.
Given that Baker does not foreclose the arguments in Part IV,
what follows demonstrates that judicial control of executive discretion
in the form of requiring executive adherence to customary international
law raises separation of powers problems in at least two senses. First,
judicial control would interfere with the President's discretion to participate in the formation, at the international level, of customary international law. Second, judicial control would fly in the face of two
hundred years of precedent recognizing the controlling domestic legal
effect of presidential discretion in foreign relations matters.
200.

Id. at 211.

201. Id.
202.

Id. at 212-13.
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The President and the Formation of InternationalLaw

However limited the President's domestic lawmaking authority
may be, he clearly has considerable authority to create legal effects in
the international context. The President's authority to take actions in
the field of international relations that will, among other things, create
rules of decision for domestic courts is discussed below.203 Aside from
this type of authority, however, the President has authority to "legislate" with respect to customary international law. The existence of this
legislative authority on the international level necessarily affects the
subject here under discussion.
Preliminarily, it is important to stress that the President's capacity
to take actions having international legal effects is significantly greater
than his capacity to create legal effects domestically without congressional authority. The President can, on his own authority, enter into
executive agreements with foreign states.20 4 Whatever the domestic effect that such agreements may have, their international status is no different from that of treaties; executive agreements are legally binding
obligations of the United States. 05 Again, the President may, on his
own authority, terminate treaties to end a legal relationship with a foreign state.20 6 Further, the President's role in making treaties that
clearly have the effect of domestic law is much greater than his role in
the enactment of statutes. Statutes may and usually do originate in the
Congress; only the President can negotiate to determine the content of
treaties, and he, not the Congress, decides whether to submit treaties to
the Senate for consent. Moreover, whereas a statute can be enacted
over a Presidential veto, the President may refuse to ratify a treaty
even if the Senate has consented to ratification.
Against this background, in what sense can the President be said to
have lawmaking authority with respect to customary law? Responding
to this question requires consideration of both the process by which
customary international law is made and the structure of the United
States government. Considering first the formation of customary international law, it is important to note that this body of law is a distillation of the practice of states; accordingly, determining its content
requires consideration of all the various types of activity that can be
203. See infra notes 212-74 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
205. Id. at 330-31. In Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 28-32 (1982), the Supreme Court
clearly assumed that an executive agreement may be an international obligation of the United

States.
206.

See

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., 1ST

SENATE IN TREATY RATIFICATION app.

treaties).

SESs.,

ROLE OF THE

4, at 74-76 (listing cases in which President has terminated
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denominated "state practice"-for example, diplomatic contacts, policy
decisions, executive actions, practice and votes in international organizations, and patterns of treaties.20 In essence, every time a state takes a
position with respect to a particular question in international relations,
the state is not only acting to deal with that particular question, but
also providing an example of state practice that can affect the content
of customary international law. In that sense, every state action in the
international arena has a double quality. Each state action is simultaneously a response to a given concrete problem and, in effect, a legislative
act. Through its own actions and its responses to the actions of other
states, the state provides evidence on a given subject either that a "general practice of states" exists, or that one does not. Because the existence of a general practice is an essential prerequisite to the formation
of a rule of customary international law, if no general practice exists,
then no rule of international law on the subject can exist. States'
choices of practice, therefore, amount to "votes" for or against particular rules of customary international law.
Against this method of forming customary law, the importance of
the United States government's structure becomes obvious. Most of the
activities of the United States that can amount to state practice are
under the control of the President, as a matter of American law.2" 8 All
communication with foreign governments on behalf of the United
States as an entity is carried on by the President, which means that the
President or his subordinates decide what the content of the United
States side of these communications shall be. Diplomatic correspondence is a form of state practice; it must conform to the views of the
President. Responses to overtures from other states depend on the
President's views. Patterns of treaties can create customary international law, and the President determines both the positions the United
States takes in particular negotiations and whether to ratify treaties,
assuming the Senate consents to ratification. 0 9 The positions that the
United States asserts in the international arena-the claims the United
States makes regarding its entitlements under international law-also
are determined by the President. Thus, to the extent the United States
participates in the formation of customary international law, it does so
largely through the President's acts.
Both the nature of customary international law and the authority
of the American President are obviously relevant to the problem here
under discussion. Professor Charney has stressed that the process of
207.

See, e.g., I. BROWNLE, supra note 2, at 5-6.

208. See generally L.
209. Id. at 130.

HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

45-50 (1972).
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changing the content of customary international law often involves violating existing rules of law, and that a rule of American domestic law
requiring the President to obey existing rules of customary international law would, in effect, disable this country from participating in
the process of changing customary law. 1 ' While Professor Charney is
correct in these assertions, 1 1 the problem is more fundamental than the
functional difficulty of the United States' participating in the formation
of customary international law if the courts can forbid the President to
violate that body of law. The problem is rather that a judicial effort to
control the President's discretion as to the day-to-day state practice of
the United States amounts to control of legislative choice. Such control
would be precisely identical to the courts' seeking to control the votes
of individual members of Congress in matters of domestic law for reasons unrelated to the constitutionality of the members' actions.
This latter type of effort at control would obviously be a usurpation, but it is helpful to make explicit why this result is obvious. The
answer follows from the nature of the legislator's task. Not merely the
right, but the duty of a legislator is to vote as he thinks best with respect to a given measure. By establishing the Congress and leaving it
free to exercise its discretion as to most matters, the Constitution indicates that it expects the members of Congress to behave as legislators
behave with respect to the vast range of matters left to congressional
discretion. A judicial effort, not grounded in the Constitution, to require a particular legislative outcome amounts to depriving officials of
discretion vested in them by the Constitution. The effort itself thus
would be unconstitutional. Similarly, since the President acts as the
primary American legislator in the field of customary international law
by determining the day-to-day practice of the United States, judicial
efforts to control that practice on nonconstitutional grounds amount to
interference with legislative discretion vested in the President by the
Constitution. The field of legislation is different-international as opposed to domestic law-but the constitutional question is the same. By
giving the President control of most of the state practice of the United
States, the Constitution vested the President with legislative discretion
to cast the "vote" of the United States in matters of customary law. If
210. Charney, supra note 15, at 914-21.
211. Some commentators criticize the view that states change international law by violating
it, by asserting that there is no difference between a violation of international law by a state and
violation of a rule of domestic law by a subject of the domestic legal system. See, e.g., Paust, supra
note 5, at 388. This view ignores the fundamental difference between the status of states in the
international legal system and that of subjects of domestic systems. The former are simultaneous
subjects and legislators. The latter are merely subjects. Violations of international law by states
can thus be legislative acts; violations by individuals in domestic systems cannot be legislative.
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the Court has no basis in the Constitution for limiting that discretion,
the Court acts unconstitutionally if it in effect seeks to limit a discretion the Constitution has left unlimited.
B.

The President and Domestic Law

The foregoing argument stresses that separation of powers principles foreclose the courts' interference with the President's legislative
duties on the international plane. Aside from this international legislative aspect of the question, however, the President clearly has the authority to create legal effects within the domestic legal system of the
United States on a wide variety of matters without regard to the strictures of customary international law. In some cases, the courts have
held that the President's decisions create a rule of decision that the
courts are obliged to follow without regard to international law. In
others, the courts have held that domestic law gives the President a
discretion on certain subjects that the courts may not control and that
these subjects include matters regulated by international law. In both
categories of cases, however, it is abundantly clear that the courts simply have not seen customary international law as a basis for judicial
limitation of presidential discretion.
The cases recognizing the President's authority to, in effect, make
law for the courts without regard to international law cover a number of
subjects. One of these subjects is the question of the territorial extent
of the United States. Such an issue arose in Jones v. United States,212
in which the defendant, convicted of a murder committed upon a guano
island in the Caribbean claimed by the United States, challenged the
federal court's jurisdiction. The defense turned on whether the island
was subject to the sovereignty of the United States. The Court held
that it was bound to defer to the Executive's assertion that the island
had not been subject to the sovereignty of any other nation when the
United States claimed it pursuant to an act of Congress that permitted
the United States to claim such unclaimed guano islands. The Court
deferred to the Executive's assertion, despite Haiti's claim of sovereignty. The Court held:
[I]f the executive, in his correspondence with the government of Hayti, has denied
the jurisdiction which it claimed over the Island of Navassa, the fact must be taken
and acted on by this court as thus asserted and maintained; it is not material to
inquire, nor is it the province of the court to determine, whether the executive be
right or wrong; it is enough to know
that in the exercise of his constitutional func213
tions he has decided the question.
212.
213.

137 U.S. 202 (1890).
Id. at 221.
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It must be stressed that, at this time, customary international law
included a well-developed body of rules for determining sovereignty
2 15
over disputed territory,21 as the Jones court clearly understood.
Nonetheless, the Court held that it was bound by the President's
determination.
Similarly, the Court has held itself bound by executive determinations of competing foreign state claims of sovereignty over particular
territory. This issue arose in Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co.,2 1 6 a suit
upon a maritime insurance policy. The vessels insured had been seized
by the government of Buenos Aires for engaging in seal fishing in the
Falkland Islands, contrary to Buenos Aires law. The insureds argued
that the seizure was illegal because Buenos Aires was not, in fact, sovereign of the Falklands; the insureds pointed to the fact that members of
the United States executive branch, in diplomatic correspondence, had
refused to recognize Buenos Aires' sovereignty. The Court noted that
problems involving determination of sovereignty over particular territories frequently arise before maritime courts, and that inquiry on the
subject would be possible if the question were open. The Court held,
however, that it was bound by the opinions expressed by officials of the
executive branch, whether those opinions were right or wrong, and further held that expression of such opinions through diplomatic correspondence was sufficient.21 7 This latter point is significant, because the
insurance company had argued that only an act that "has the force and
sanction of regular enactment"21 8 should count as an act of government
binding on the courts. This judicial deference to executive identifications of the sovereignty of particular foreign territories has continued.
As recently as 1978, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
a case turning on a territorial dispute between three foreign states was
so political that the court would not seek to address the matter without
affirmative guidance from the executive branch. 2 9
Again, the President has absolute authority under familiar law to
recognize foreign states and governments, and to create domestic legal
effects in so doing. Thus, in United States v. Belmont,220 the Court
held that the question of recognition was a purely political one, com214. See, e.g., Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928).
215. Jones, 137 U.S. at 212.
216. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
217. Id. at 420.
218. Id. at 418.
219. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil
Co., 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
220. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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mitted exclusively to the Executive, and once made, binding on the
state and federal courts in applying the act of state doctrine.221 Similarly, Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States22 2 held that recognition was
so far conclusive on the courts as to compel them to regard as the competent government of a state whatever government the Executive recognized. The consequence of Guaranty Trust was that a statute of
limitations was held to have run against the Soviet Union during the
period in which that government was unrecognized and thus unable to
bring suit in American courts. During the relevant period the United
States had recognized another group as the government of the Russian
state, and the Russian state, as opposed to the particular government,
was thus at all times able to sue if it chose to do so. 223 International law

more clearly establishes legal criteria for evaluating the existence of a
state than for determining the group of people who are the government
of the state,224 and the foregoing cases relate to recognition of governments rather than recognition of states. Nonetheless, the sweeping language of those cases regarding the extent of the President's control over
recognition, and the holdings of the foregoing group of cases-holdings
that established the President's authority to determine the identity of
the sovereign of a particular territory-would seem to indicate that the
President has absolute discretion over questions of recognition of states
as well as governments. This discretion exists notwithstanding the existence of objective legal criteria regulating the labelling of any particular
entity as a state.
The President's authority with respect to recognition extends as
well to recognition of the existence of war, as was held in The Santis225 The Protector,
22 and The Three Friends.
227 The latsima Trinidad,
ter case also provides illustrations of the legal effect in both the
domestic and international legal systems of such recognition by the
Executive.228
The Court has shown similar deference to the Executive on a number of questions regarding treaties. For example, the petitioner in Terlinden v.

Ames 229 raised

a

question

regarding

the

continued

221. See id. at 330.
222. 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
223. Id. at 136-41.
224. Compare I BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 74-82 with I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 95
(stating that "[n]on-recognition of governments seems more 'political' than that of states").
225. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 337 (1822). The Court noted that clearly, it was the Executive
that had recognized belligerency. Id. at 305-06.

226. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 701-02 (1871).
227. 166 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1897).
228.
229.

Id. at 62-63, 64.
184 U.S. 270 (1902).
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effectiveness of a treaty, seeking to block his extradition to the German
Empire on the grounds that the treaty purporting to permit the extradition was no longer in force because the treaty had been concluded
with Prussia rather than with the German Empire. The Court rejected
this argument, holding itself bound by the determination of the executive branch that the treaty was still in force. 3 0 Similar deference on the
question of the continued vitality of a treaty was shown in Factor v.
Laubenheimer.3 1 Again, in Clark v. Allen,3 2 when it was argued that a
treaty permitting German nationals to inherit personal property had
lapsed after World War II because Germany had ceased to exist, the
Court held itself bound by the Executive's determination that Germany
could still perform its treaty obligations.133
The foregoing groups of cases all involved situations in which the
Executive could be seen as providing a rule of decision for the courts.
The Court in these cases held that a particular executive determination
regarding a question of law was binding on the courts. Distinguishable
from these cases are others in which the challenged executive action
does not purport to establish a rule of decision; the issue in these other
cases is simply whether the courts can subject the executive determination to legal evaluation.
Perhaps the subject on which judicial deference to the Executive is
most striking is the use of the armed forces. One group of cases upholds
seizures by the armed forces in violation of customary international law.
Thus, the Court held in The Ship Richmond v. United States"4 that
the jurisdiction of the district court sitting in admiralty over a particular American ship captured for violating the Non-Intercourse Act was
not affected by the fact that the U.S. Navy had, in violation of the law
of nations, seized the ship while it was in Spanish territorial waters.2 35
Similarly, in The Merino,238 the capture of an American slave-trading
230. Id. at 282-90.

231. 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
232. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
233. Id. at 514.
234. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815).
235. Id. at 104.
236. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391, 401-03 (1824). To be sure, Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933), held unlawful the seizure of British vessels for violating the liquor laws because the laws
were in violation of a treaty with Britain that the Court characterized as self-executing. Cook distinguished the earlier cases as, first of all, dealing with American vessels and, secondly, as involving
only the jurisdiction of the court, not the jurisdiction of the United States itself. In the case before
it, the Court felt the jurisdiction of the United States was limited by the treaty in question. Id. at
119, 122. Subsequent lower court decisions, however, have distinguished Cook as relying on a selfexecuting treaty, and refused to apply Cook to void seizures of even foreign vessels on the high
seas when the only illegality involved was the violation of customary international law or of nonself-executing treaties codifying customary international law. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d
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ship by elements of the U.S. armed forces in Spanish territory was held
not to affect the jurisdiction of the Court.
A second group of cases labelled as beyond judicial scrutiny the
President's decision to employ American armed forces in a particular
fashion. Thus, in The Prize Cases,3 7 the Court held that the Constitution empowered the President to declare a blockade, effective in international law, of portions of the United States engaged in insurrection,
and that the President's judgment that circumstances justified the
blockade was beyond judicial scrutiny. 3 8 Again, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,39 the Court held that the judiciary could not entertain challenges by private persons to the President's use of the armed forces
abroad, even when those challenges apparently were based on constitutional grounds.2 40 A logical corollary of Johnson is that challenges
grounded on authority of less standing than the Constitution must likewise be beyond judicial scrutiny. This judicial refusal to apply legal
standards to the use of troops abroad was echoed by a number of lower
court decisions during the Vietnam war, refusing on political question
grounds to hear various international law-based challenges to the conduct of that war by the Executive. 4 1
The President likewise has been held to have the power, exempt
from judicial scrutiny, to control any claims under international law
that the United States might have, even when executive actions operate
to reduce the rights of individual American citizens. Thus, in CharIton
v. Kelly,2 42 the Court held that, although Italy's refusal to perform all
its obligations under an extradition treaty with the United States rendered that treaty voidable by the United States, the Executive's determination to continue adhering to the treaty as in force bound the Court
to give the treaty effect, and thus to uphold the extradition of the petitioning American citizen. 4 s Similarly, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 4
the Court held that the President's authority to settle any claims American citizens might have against foreign states authorized the President
to terminate litigation commenced in the United States by individual
862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.
1978). Presumably, then, the holdings in The Richmond and The Merino are unaffected by Cook.
237. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
238. Id. at 665-71.
239. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
240. Id. at 788-89.
241. See Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1969); Luftig v. McNamara, 373
F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Hogans, 369 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1966).
242. 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
243. Id. at 476.
244. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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citizens against Iran in the wake of the overthrow of the Shah.24
The Court's reasoning on this question is worth detailing, because
this reasoning is useful for analyzing aspects of the President's foreign
affairs authority other than those directly in issue in Dames & Moore.
The Court in that case noted that no statute authorized the action the
President took,24' but also noted the existence of statutes that assume a

broad degree of presidential discretion to deal with the foreign policy
problems presented by the claims of individual citizens against foreign
states.2 47 Moreover, the Court acknowledged the long history of congressional acquiescence in claims settlements negotiated by the Executive, as evinced by the enactment of statutes necessary to carry out
such settlements.4 9 In upholding the President's authority, the Court
relied both on this history of congressional acquiescence in presidential
claims settlement and on the fact that such a settlement was, on the
facts, determined to be necessary to resolve a major dispute between
the United States and another state.249
The Court's analysis in Dames & Moore requires emphasis. The
Court was unwilling to consider the issue of presidential authority in
the abstract. Rather, it focused on congressional acquiescence in particular exercises of authority and relied on that acquiescence as vindication of the President's acts. Clearly, the Court saw the President's
constitutional authority on these subjects to be so great as not to require prior congressional authorization to permit actions having an effect in international law. Indeed, congressional action apparently is not
necessary at any time; congressional acquiescence suffices. A second
point, made by a note writer in the Columbia Law Review, also bears
repeating. If international law is part of the law that the President is to
"take care" to see faithfully executed, it seems inconsistent with the
President's responsibilities to permit him to waive claims for violations
of international law. 250 The fact that after Dames & Moore the Presi-

dent clearly has authority to waive such claims certainly casts doubt on
the assumption that international law fits within the language of the
"take care" clause, at least in the sense of being a judicially enforceable
obligation.
Finally, the courts' handling of treaties in a number of respects
demonstrates that in that area, too, there is a zone of executive discre245. Id. at 686.
246. Id. at 675-77.
247. Id. at 677-79.
248. Id. at 679-84.
249. Id. at 688.
250. Note, The IranianHostage Agreement Under Internationaland United States Law, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 822, 855 (1981).
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tion into which the courts may not enter. As noted above, a number of
instances exist in which the President has, on his own authority, terminated treaty relationships, apparently with the acquiescence of Congress.25 ' As Dames & Moore indicates, this congressional acquiescence
in a long-standing presidential claim of authority reinforces that claim.
The President's authority to waive the rights of the United States resulting from breaches by other parties to treaties was discussed above.
Beyond these two subjects, the President has a considerable zone of
discretion in the day-to-day carrying out of treaty obligations. Discussion of this subject, however, requires a brief explanation of the concept
of the self-executing treaty.
Although the Constitution labels treaties "the supreme law of the
land," along with statutes and the Constitution, 5 2 the Supreme Court
held relatively early in the history of the Republic that not all treaties
could be enforced by the judiciary. In the famous case of Foster& Elam
v. Neilson,53 the Court held that treaties imposing an obligation to
bring about some state of affairs in the future amounted to a contract
between states that only could be carried out, on the part of the United
States, by the political branches of government. In the case of such a
treaty, therefore, judicial enforcement was not possible until the political branches had actually carried out the promise.2 ' In the Head
Money Cases,255 the Court amplified its treatment of this subject, noting that a treaty was primarily a compact between independent states
and that its enforcement depended entirely on diplomatic negotiation-not upon the judiciary. A treaty was judicially enforceable, the
Court held, only to the extent it conferred rights upon individuals.256
2 57 is that
Finally, the necessary implication of Johnson v. Eisentrager
even treaties conferring rights on individuals are not judicially enforceable if, as properly interpreted, they evince an intent that they be enforced by some agency other than the judiciary. This conclusion seems
to follow from the Court's holding that the Geneva Convention of July
27, 1929,58 many provisions of which clearly confer rights on individuals,259 cannot be enforced against the executive branch of the United
States government by American courts because the Convention's terms
251.

See supra note 208 and accompanying text.

252. U.S.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

CONsT.

art. VI.

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
Id. at 313-14.
112 U.S. 580 (1884).
Id. at 598-99.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846.
See, e.g., id. arts. 6, 10-12, 16, 19, 42, 50, 61, at 2032, 2034-37, 2045, 2048, 2052.
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demonstrate that a different enforcement mechanism was intended.260
Reading these cases together yields the clear conclusion that a treaty
not expressly addressing the question of the manner of its enforcement
will only be treated as judicially enforceable and self-executing-that is,
treated upon its proclamation as law of the United States without further action by the United States government-if the treaty's subject
matter can be said to confer rights upon individuals, and then only if
judicial enforcement appears to be intended by the treaty.
The implications of the concept of self-executing treaties are obvious. First, the concept is further proof that international law is not of
constitutional stature in the American legal hierarchy; if it were, how
could the courts fail to implement the international legal obligation created by non-self-executing treaties? Beyond this point, the Executive
clearly may take actions violative of treaties that the courts will not
address. The alleged treaty violations in the Johnson case provide an
example; 61 others are provided by the lower court cases refusing to nullify searches carried out by the armed forces on the high seas in violation of treaty obligations. 262 The courts in these cases do not deny that

actions by the Executive can amount to violations of United States obligations in international law. These courts, nonetheless, hold that the
Executive is beyond judicial control with respect to the carrying out of
American obligations under non-self-executing treaties.
In drawing together the foregoing discussion, it becomes clear that
the President has broad-ranging authority to create legal effects in domestic law with respect to international legal matters and is exempt
from judicial scrutiny with respect to other actions having effects in international law. Taken together, these circumstances simply are incompatible with the argument that the President can be compelled by the
courts to adhere to international law, or even with the argument that
the President has a constitutional obligation, albeit unenforceable, to
adhere to international law. The last assertion, in particular, is irreconcilable with, for example, the Supreme Court's recognition of presidential power to make the law with respect to questions of sovereignty over
particular territory. Given the broad scope of presidential authority in
this area, judicial efforts to control his discretion would amount to
usurpation.
Professor Glennon, who takes a position contrary to the one taken
in this portion of the Article, has raised a counterargument that deserves addressing. Glennon asserts that "[t]he trend in recent foreign
260. 339 U.S. at 789 n.14.
261. Id. at 788-89.
262. See supra note 236.
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relations cases, particularly those relating to recognition and sovereign
immunity, indicates that the courts will consider questions of international law and may decide them in a manner at odds with executive
policy."26 3 He discusses only two cases in support of this surprising assertion, neither of which supports the assertion.
The first case he mentions is Zschernig v. Miller,2 64 in which the
Court held an Oregon statute limiting the rights of nonresident aliens
to inherit property in Oregon unconstitutional as an impermissible state
intrusion into the federal foreign affairs power.2 65 Professor Glennon
characterizes the Court's decision as "declin[ing] the Executive's invitation to let the statute stand;" the "invitation" referred to was apparently a State Department characterization of the statute as having little
effect on American foreign relations.2 6 Professor Glennon's reliance on
this case is misplaced for several reasons. First, the executive branch
was not arguing that the Oregon statute should stand; rather, the executive branch urged the Court to reverse the Oregon court's application
of the statute, albeit on the ground that the statute conflicted with an
applicable treaty rather than on the constitutional ground the Court
applied.26 7 Second, the case had nothing to do with international law;
the case simply held that, under the Constitution, the statute represented an invasion by the state of an exclusively federal domain. To the
extent that the Court based its opinion on the actual effect of the statute, the Court apparently was rejecting the government's characterization of the statute as innocuous. Whether the Court was relying on the
actual effect of the statute, however, is not entirely clear; the opinion
states that the statute "has a direct impact upon foreign relations and
may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal
with those problems. ' 266 This statement suggests that the Court may
have been seeking to underline the impropriety of even the possibility
of the state interference with national foreign policy. The case, however,
presented no question of international law, and certainly cannot be said
to represent judicial rejection of executive foreign policy determinations; the government, after all, had asked the Court to overturn the
statute, and the Court did, albeit for reasons different than those the
government urged.
The second case on which Professor Glennon relies, First National
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
(No. 21).
268.

Glennon, Paquete Habana, supra note 5, at 351.
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
Id. at 440-41.
Glennon, Paquete Habana, supra note 5, at 352.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States at 15, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
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City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,269 is likewise inapposite. As Professor Glennon correctly indicates, six Justices in that case "declined to
require lower-court deference to a State Department determination
'270
that the United States could disregard the act-of-state doctrine.

Here again, however, the determination was a matter of American constitutional law, not international law. Justice Brennan, writing for four
of the six justices and advancing an analysis with which Justice Douglas
agreed, 1 insisted that the subject of the suit, a taking of property by
Cuba, was a political question, 2 and insisted that the "Executive
Branch, however extensive its powers in the area of foreign affairs, cannot by simple stipulation change a political question into a cognizable
claim.

2 73
-

In an accompanying footnote, Justice Brennan rejected an

analogy to cases involving recognition and sovereign immunity, insisting
that the key difference between such cases and the act of state doctrine
was that, in following executive determinations in those areas,
[i]n no event has the judiciary necessarily been called upon to assess a claim under
international law. The effect of following a "Bernstein letter," of course, is exactly
the opposite-the Judicial Branch must reach a judgment despite the possible absence of consensus on the applicable rules, the risk of irritation to sensitive concerns of other74countries, and the danger of impairment to the conduct of our
foreign policy.

Far from claiming authority to apply international law, the four dissenters plus Justice Douglas objected to an approach that could force
them to apply international law. This case, like Sabbatino, was a separation of powers case, not an international law case; the Justices upon
whom Professor Glennon relies were not seeking to control executive
foreign policy determinations on the basis of international law. Quite
the contrary, they were refusing to accept a construction of the powers
of the judiciary, urged by the Executive, that would permit such judicial interference in the actual conduct of foreign policy. These Justices
clearly rejected the argument that the courts have the power Professor
Glennon claims they possess.
While both of these cases have a foreign relations aspect, neither
involves the Court's setting aside an executive foreign policy determination on the basis of international law. In both, to the contrary, the issue
involved the Constitution. While the Court did not defer to the Executive in either case, that the Supreme Court read the Constitution for
269.
270.
Nacional
271.
272.
273.
274.

406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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itself, not as the executive directed, is certainly not news. In neither
case, however, was the Court seeking to control the Executive's choices
in foreign policy; the Court simply held that, however advantageous for
the Executive, neither the states nor the courts could exercise judgment
in matters of foreign policy that were the province of the federal political branches. The existence of the trend that Professor Glennon recognizes is certainly not proved by the cases he discusses.
The foregoing discussions indicate the breadth of the President's
legislative authority in the field of international relations. This authority simply is different in kind from that which the President exercises
in domestic affairs. The President can take steps that create international legal relationships in a number of ways: by entering into executive agreements or ratifying treaties, and also by controlling the day-today state practice of the United States, which amounts to "casting the
vote" of the United States in the process by which customary international law is created. This state of affairs does not mean that the President's authority is superior to that of Congress on these subjects; this
Article does not purport to address the question of the relative foreign
relations powers of the two political branches. This Article only asserts
that the President's authority does not depend on a congressional
grant. Indeed, Dames & Moore seems to permit the conclusion that, in
the field of foreign relations, affirmative congressional disapproval is
needed to cast doubt on the President's authority to take actions in our
relations with other nations that bind the courts, at least when such
actions have been taken by Presidents over an extended period.
These cases make clear that the courts may not control the discretion of the President in international relations. The courts have always
assumed their authority over foreign relations to be essentially nonexistent relative to that of the executive branch. Because asking the courts
to apply customary international law to control the executive in foreign
relations matters is, as Erie makes clear, asking them to claim authority
over foreign relations matters, if the courts do not have that authority
they must decline the invitation to act as though they had the authority. Further, as shown above, customary international law is, at best,
federal common law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal common law cannot be applied to override a congressional legislative determination, so by parity of reasoning, federal common law
cannot override a President's legislative determination regarding those
subjects on which he can legislate. Because, as demonstrated above, the
President can bind the courts concerning our relations with other
states, at least when Congress or the Senate in its treaty-making capacity has not acted, then federal common law may not override this Presidential "legislation." Whichever route one takes, the result is the same:
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even under the rubric of applying customary international law, control
of foreign relations belongs, as between the Executive and the courts, to
the Executive.
V.

CONCLUSION

The contention that the courts of the United States may compel
the President to adhere to customary international law raises questions
of constitutional law that can be analyzed by the tools of traditional
legal analysis. This Article has sought to provide that analysis. This Article questions the applicability of the "take care" clause to legal obligations created by customary international law. It stresses that, to the
extent the federal courts may apply customary international law, this
law is subject to all the limitations to which other branches of federal
common law are subject. This limitation lends significance to the fact
that the courts, absent clear direction from either or both the Constitution or Congress, have never relied on federal common law to control
the discretion of the political branches of government. Finally, this Article has tried to make clear the extent to which presidential policy
choices in international matters bind the courts, and thus, necessarily,
cannot be controlled by the courts.
Before concluding, however, it is necessary to make explicit attitudes which may underlie the courts' analyses. The first attitude concerns the nature of policy decisions relating to international issues. To
say that a subject is governed by law is to say that it is controlled by an
overarching policy determination embodied in a legal rule. To enact a
legal rule on a subject is to fix the government's response to each occasion in which that subject presents itself. If for some reason it is
deemed inexpedient to predetermine a particular governmental response to a particular public question, the only possible legal rule is
that there can be no rule-a situation that leaves the government free
to react as the circumstances of the individual case seem to dictate.
The assertion that American foreign policy, as determined by the
President, must conform to customary international law, is thus to say
that foreign policy issues are not to be decided on an ad hoc basis, but
that the questions that foreign policy issues present are to be resolved
according to the responses customary international law has programmed. The decisions, however, make clear that American courts simply
are not convinced that the subject of international relations lends itself
to the fixed responses that are the hallmark of legal rules. From the
statement in the Chinese Exclusion Case,2 7 5 justifying the conclusion
that a statute may override an earlier treaty, that "[u]nexpected events
275.
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may call for a change in the policy of the country,"" 6 to the statement
in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,"' in the course of
refusing to hold articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter selfexecuting, that "judicial resolution of cases bearing significantly on sensitive foreign policy matters, like the case before us, might have serious
foreign policy implications which courts are ill-equipped to anticipate
or handle, ' 27 8 the courts have seen foreign relations as presenting highly
mutable questions that simply do not lend themselves to the fixing of
policy choices by freezing them in a rule of law. The courts clearly are
unwilling to assume that the public interest of the United States can be
served if the government's responses to foreign policy issues are limited
to those that international law permits.
Closely related to the foregoing issue is the matter of democratic
control of national decisionmaking. The federal courts' reluctance to
make common law obviously reflects a belief that policy choices not
fixed in the Constitution are properly left to the branches of the government directly responsible to the people. Holding that the Executive
is constrained by international law, however, runs counter to this deference to democracy in two ways. Most obviously, such a holding would
shift power from the elected President to the unelected courts. Such a
holding also could leave the United States bound by policy choices in
which no element of the American government actively participated.
This result could occur because the United States can easily be held to
be bound by a rule of customary international law to which it did not
object during the process of its formation, even if it did not actively
participate in advancing the rule. 7 9 Consciously or not, the courts' refusal to hold the Executive to the limits fixed by international law
amounts to leaving policy choices to a branch of government clearly
controlled by the American people, rather than making the policy followed by the United States in the first instance a judicial determination
and at least partly dependent upon the other states participating in the
process of forming customary international law.
Finally, implicit in discussions of this subject is a disagreement
about the proper role of American courts in dealing with the international legal system. Professor Glennon has justified his expansive view
of the courts' role by arguing that action by the courts can help preserve the international legal system.28 0 If anything is clear in the opinions of the Supreme Court, however, it is that American courts are
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American courts. Their primary obligation is not to the international
legal system, but to the well-being of the United States. Arguments certainly can be made that adherence to customary international law is in
the interests of the United States, but the courts focus on the interests
of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall asserted that "[i]t is not
for its courts to interfere with the proceedings of the nation, and to
thwart its views,"2 ' and his successors have agreed.
In short, beyond strict legal analysis, the cases make clear that the
courts see themselves as obliged to further the interests of the United
States as decided by policymakers responsible to the American people.
To hold the Executive bound by customary international law is to impose rigidities on policy choices that the courts do not believe will always be in the nation's interest, to weaken the control of foreign policy
by persons responsible to the American electorate, and to impose these
harms in the name of an international legal system that has at best a
secondary claim on the courts' loyalty. Not surprisingly, the courts have
not taken this route.
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